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One of the pillars of economic thought is the concept of constrained optimization.  
The economist says: if I know what it is that you want (your objective), and I know 
what choices are available to you (your constraints), then I can predict how you will 
behave.  How?  Simple.  Determine which of those possible choices gives you the 
“most” of what you want, and that is what you will choose.  After all, why would an 
individual intentionally choose any other outcome? 
I personally find this logic appealing.  Perhaps that is why I have chosen to 
study economics.  Constrained optimization – in which individuals (or organizations) 
choose from available options so as to maximize some objective – is an extremely 
tidy way of viewing the world, and potentially a powerful one.  Difficult problems of 
choice ultimately boil down to the solution of a math problem – albeit often a difficult 
problem.  However, the method is fragile in (at least) two fundamental ways. 
The first is the assumption that agents do in fact make choices so as to 
maximize their objective.  This is what I will call the assumption of rationality.  
Unfortunately, while this usage of the term rational is a common one, there is another, 
related usage which critics of this approach tend to call upon.  Rationality in those 
contexts is used to describe how agents make choices: it implies that individuals are 
little more than cold-blooded computers that go through a comprehensive deliberative 
process before making any decisions.  This caricature bears so little resemblance to 
our common experiences that it may lead some to quickly discard the optimization 
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framework altogether.  Surely emotional factors play a role in our everyday lives, and 
do we really carefully process all available information before making even the 
smallest decisions? 
Now, when I speak of rationality, I do not make any claims as to how 
individuals make decisions.  Rather, I am merely referring to the principle that 
individuals do not in general intentionally choose second-best (or worse) alternatives.  
To do so is akin to making the statement: “I know I prefer to do X, but I choose Y.”  I 
am reluctant to accept that this is the standard model of how humans behave.  If it is, 
then the vast majority of economic theory is an irrelevant intellectual exercise, even 
as an approximation.  As for the question of the procedures that go on in an 
individual’s brain when determining a course of action, I do not believe an 
economist’s skills are well suited to such a question.  Neuroscience and psychology 
would seem more appropriate, and in fact there has been progress recently with 
respect to how the brain actually processes information and makes decisions (see 
Damasio 1994 and 2003 for a non-technical overview).  At any rate, to avoid the 
possibility of confusion, from this point forward I will use the terms such as 
“optimal” or “neoclassical” to refer to my narrower definition of rationality.  
Actually, an agent would probably never make the above statement “I know I 
prefer X, but choose Y.”  Instead, we, as outsiders, might see an agent choose Y; 
while we believe X is actually optimal.  This leads to the second potentially fragile 
assumption underlying the method of constrained optimization.  What is the 
individual’s objective?  In practice, economists will typically assume that an agent’s 
objective function takes on some convenient mathematical form, spin it through the 
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standard toolbox, and study the implications.  This makes the problems we encounter 
tractable, and tractability is of no small importance. 
However, tractability does not necessarily make the procedure accurate.  Take, 
for instance, the caricature of the homo-economicus.  This type of agent is only 
concerned with his own material well-being.  That is, in his utility function you’d 
only find items like consumption, or money.  If we observe this homo-economicus 
giving money to charity, then he is behaving in a non-optimal manner, since we have 
pinned down his objective function as not having any preference for such a non-
material object.  Fine.  However, if we observe another agent – for whom we have not 
pinned down such a clean set of preferences – give money to charity, we should not 
apply the homo-economicus’s preferences to her and conclude she too is being non-
optimal.  Her actual preferences could require charitable giving as a means of 
maximizing her overall well-being. 
 
While the three essays which follow are strictly independent of each other, the 
common thread uniting them all is that each essay suggests how modifying an agent’s 
objective functions away from a more conventional form can bring theoretically 
“optimal” behaviors more in line with potentially puzzling observations.  First, 
Chapter 1 suggests that terrorists – even suicide terrorists – cannot be necessarily 
dismissed as completely irrational. It appears that economic conditions – as 
represented by the price of crude oil – seem to be related to the frequency of attacks.  
I argue that deteriorating economic health in the region may tip some individuals who 
are receptive to the notion of being a terrorist into actually being a terrorist.  This 
 4
reminds us that policymakers might well benefit from economic-style models that 
explicitly note that some individuals – that is, prospective terrorists – have a 
preference for making destructive, symbolic attacks against their enemies.  We should 
not be quick to dismiss them as being simply “crazy.” 
Chapter 2, on monetary policy, follows a (vaguely) similar line of reasoning.  
Here, we present a surprising finding that interest rates chosen by the central banks of 
the US and the EU appear to respond to the variance of unemployment across regions.  
While we propose several theoretical explanations for this phenomena, the one which 
most accurately describes the Federal Reserve’s policy (but not the ECB’s) is the one 
in which we modify the Federal Reserve’s objective function to one that includes a 
preference for less variance in overall welfare across states. 
It is in chapter 3 where the above discussion on the importance of correctly 
describing preferences is most relevant.  Here, I describe how it is technically 
straightforward to include emotions explicitly in an agent’s utility function.  I go on 
to explore some of the implications of augmenting the objective functions of 
individuals in this way, and find that this technique seems to be an appropriate in 
describing many emotionally-linked behaviors.  That the framework can be useful in 
a variety of contexts suggests that it might be an appropriate baseline model for 
describing behavior.  While the technique may not be universally applicable, it seems 
reasonable to try and expand the standard framework of constrained optimization to 
describe more than just the behavior of cold-blooded automatons.  Indeed, 
acknowledging that humans might have preferences over hot-blooded passions has 
the potential to open up new worlds for economic-style analyses of behavior. 
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Chapter 1 




While acts of terrorism are usually attributed to motivations of political, 
religious, or other ideological nature, this paper provides evidence suggesting 
that certain types of terrorist attacks are correlated with changes in a readily 
available economic variable.  Particularly, over the last thirty years significant 
terrorist attacks directed against the United States or Western European targets 
by Middle Eastern organizations occur more often after the price of crude oil 
falls than after it rises.  A series of logistic regressions estimate how the 
probability of attack varies based purely on changes in oil prices over various 
time horizons.   While the probabilities of attack implied by these regressions are 
not extraordinarily large even after significant changes in oil prices, the relative 
change in probabilities is considerable.  The paper further informally discusses 
two hypotheses for why there might be a causal relationship between oil prices 
and terrorist events of the sort suggested by the empirical results.  The most 
plausible of these is an expected utility model, in which those that are 
predisposed to committing terrorist acts – but have yet to do so – may be 
triggered to act when local economic conditions deteriorate. 
 
   
 




The motivations for terrorist attacks are usually attributed to political, 
religious, and/or ideological conflicts.  There can also be little doubt that clashes in 
these dimensions are fundamental in spurring terrorist activity.  After all, terrorism is 
but one form of rebellion – albeit a horrific one – which requires at least a minimal 
level of discontent with the status quo.  Unfortunately, conflicts along these 
dimensions are often unchanging for long periods of time, making it difficult to 
monitor their changes so as to try and gauge when the likelihood of a terrorist strike is 
high.  This is regrettable, as an improved ability to predict terrorist events based on 
changing conditions can only benefit efforts to detect and prevent such attacks. 
Moreover, while the literature is fairly thin, economic explanations of terrorist 
activity have not generally been successful.  In their analysis of cross-sectional data 
from Lebanon and the occupied territories in Israel, Krueger and Maleckova (2002) 
argue that the participation in and support for terrorism is not correlated with poverty.  
Indeed, they find that Palestinian suicide bombers tend to be drawn disproportionately 
from households not in poverty.  This finding is echoed by Atran (2003). While 
Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana’s (2002) results suggest that “terrorism from within” 
is correlated with the business cycle, their finding is limited to high income nations, 
and lacks the international dimension that dominates the current policy debate. 
This paper diverges from these literatures.  The evidence presented here 
suggests that in one instance readily available economic data can aid in predicting the 
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timing of a certain type of terrorist event.  Specifically, the key empirical finding 
below is that, over the last thirty years significant terrorist attacks aimed against the 
United States or Western European nations1 by organizations based in the Middle 
East are considerably more frequent after a decline in crude oil prices than after an 
increase.  A series of logistic regressions verifies this observation, and ultimately 
allows one to assign a probability as to whether or not a terrorist attack will occur 
next month based solely on recent movements in oil prices.  While this paper does not 
take the position that changes in oil prices are a primary cause of anti-Western 
terrorism, the evidence and discussion presented here suggests why it is sensible for 
oil price movements of this nature to in fact be a contributing factor to the periodic 
surges in Middle-Eastern terrorist activity against the West. 
The bulk of what follows is devoted to describing the very simple approach 
used to uncover this somewhat surprising finding, along with the results themselves 
and a brief demonstration of the straightforward conversion of these results to 
probabilities of an attack.  Section 2 covers some of the nuts and bolts of the data and 
its construction.  This is followed in Section 3 by a description of the general flavor 
of data, with Section 4 presenting the key quantitative results.  While the paper’s 
main contribution is as a piece of descriptive statistics, the discussion in Section 5 
considers some of the implications of these findings and informally suggests two 
                                                 
1 Which will be referred to jointly as “the West” or “Western Nations.”  I include here attacks against 
Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia. 
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causal hypotheses for why this apparent inverse relationship between oil prices and 
terrorism might exist. 
2 Event Selection and Timing 
As we are interested in how oil prices move before (and, to a lesser extent, 
after) terrorist events, it is obviously important how we choose those events.  
Terrorism is defined by the United States government as premeditated, politically 
motivated violence against civilians or non-mobilized military personnel by either 
sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.  
In the analysis that follows, the following additional criteria is imposed when 
selecting events: A) the principle target of the attack was civilians or military 
personnel of Western Nations, B) the attack was instigated by groups with Middle 
Eastern origins, and C) the attack was of significant size.2  A dummy variable (E) was 
coded 1 for each month where a qualifying event occurred, and zero otherwise.  Table 
1.1 lists 43 terrorist events selected since 1974 that meet these criteria, based on 
several different data sources.  There are 353 possible months between January 1974 
and May 2003, so an event occurs in about 12.2% of the months in this time period. 
The measure of oil prices used in this paper is the monthly average of Persian 
Gulf crude oil prices paid by American refineries.  This data is provided by the U.S. 
                                                 
2 By significant size, I impose the requirement that at least 5 individuals are held hostage, kidnapped, 
injured or killed in a given event. 
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Energy Information Administration.3  In an attempt to keep these prices in constant 
dollars, they are deflated by the United States consumer price index (CPI) excluding 
energy.4  
While the level of oil prices is important in this study, the key analyses that 
follow focus on how prices were changing around terrorist events.  One potentially 
important consideration will be how we consider the timing of oil price changes 
around the terrorist events.  A priori, we do not want to exclude the possibility that oil 
prices adjust immediately in response to a terrorist event.  Given that the terrorist 
groups in this analysis are of Middle Eastern origin, and the Middle East provides a 
large fraction of the world’s supply of oil, oil traders may view terrorist activities – or 
lack thereof – as indicative of changing stability in oil supplies.  Thus, a terrorist 
event may impact petroleum prices immediately.  If prices are indeed immediately 
influenced by terrorist events, then the price of oil during the month an event takes 
place would not give us a good measure of what prices would have been in the 
absence of the event. This would be particularly true if the event occurred early in a 
month.   
                                                 
3 While Persian Gulf Crude prices are used predominantly throughout this paper, the same analysis was 
performed with a composite OPEC price, a U.S. domestic crude oil price, and a composite U.S. refiner 
acquisition cost.  The results are similar for all price series, which is unsurprising given the high 
correlation of prices across types.  However, there do appear to be small timing differences across each 
series, which is likely a result of the data collection process. 
4 As Middle East Oil transactions are typically denominated in American dollars, and the currencies of 
Middle Eastern nations are pegged to the dollar, deflating by a U.S. price index is appropriate.  Using 
the version of the CPI that excludes energy prices is also reasonable, as oil prices might otherwise 
independently contribute to movements of the CPI, which we want to avoid. 
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In an attempt to allay this concern, when measuring how prices change around 
a given month I use the price of oil in the preceding month as a reference point.  
Thus, for clarity two different terms are used throughout this paper.  Each observation 
in the data represents one month, which I’ll call a “month of interest.”  In the end, it is 
these “months of interest” that we care about, and there may, or may not be, a 
qualifying terrorist event within that month.  The month preceding each “month of 
interest” I call a “reference month.” All changes in oil prices around a month of 
interest (time t) are calculated relative to the price in the preceding (or “reference”) 
month (time t-1).  I thus define the variable 1ln( ) ln( )
k
t t k tP price price− −= − as the 
change in the price of oil between time t and horizon k.  If prices rise over this time 
period, the value of Ptk will be negative.  In short, Ptk is a measure of how much 
higher, in percentage terms, prices were k months ago.  
There is one caveat, however, for this “month of interest” and “reference 
month” relationship.  Note that a number of the events took place in the last week of a 
given month (see Table 1.1).  When an event occurs at the end of a month, even if oil 
prices do indeed respond immediately to this event, the average prices for the month 
in which the event occurred would not be expected to change significantly.  For those 
cases where events occur at the end of the month, the price of oil during the actual 
event month would seem to be a better measure of the prices that precede an event 
than the prices during the previous month.  Mechanically, I attribute the “month of 
interest” for these end-of-month events to the following month.  These attributions are 
included in Table 1.1. 
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3 General Trends 
Having selected a set of events that meet the above criteria, next on the 
agenda is to examine how oil prices generally tend to move around these terrorist 
events.  As an overview of the data, Figure 1.1 plots the real Persian Gulf Crude Oil 
price level over the period January 1974 – May 2003, with vertical bars representing 
the dates of the terrorist attacks in Table 1.1.   One impression taken from this chart is 
that terrorist attacks were particularly frequent during two time spans – January 1983 
through January 1987, and January 1997 through January 1999 – during which crude 
prices were falling significantly. Another overt feature is that relatively few events 
occurred during the price run-up of the second oil crisis. 
This impression is further strengthened by scrutinizing how prices were 
changing on average around the dates of the terrorist attacks.  (See Figure 1.2.) The 
variables graphed here are the average and median value of the price change variable 
Ptk, which was defined above, at various horizons of k months.  The average and 
median values are calculated both for months where a terrorist event occurs and 
months where one does not.  The downward trend in oil prices prior to months when 
terrorist events occur differs strikingly from the price trend before months where 
events do not occur.   
It turns out that the differences – both for the averages and the medians – are 
statistically significant. Table 1.2 provides an event-by-event breakdown of oil price 
changes in the months preceding the events.  (This is the data underlying Figure 1.2 
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for the 12 months preceding the events.)  T-tests of the means and Pearson Chi-
Squared tests of the medians reveal the statistical significance of the differences 
between event/non-event months.  Furthermore, it is apparent from the last two rows 
of this table that oil prices fall prior to an event considerably more often than they 
rise.  For example, six months before an event oil prices were more than 10% higher 
than in the reference month in 15 out of 43 cases and were 10% or lower for only 4.  
By the same criteria, at nine and twelve month horizons the ratio is 21 against 6 – a 
ratio greater than three to one.5 
4 Main Results 
4.1 Core Regressions 
From this preliminary “eyeballing” of the data, there is a strong suggestion 
that oil price movements tend to be systematically different prior to months where a 
qualifying terrorist event occurs than prior to months where one does not.  The next 
objective is to gauge whether these changes in oil prices alone can in fact help 
improve a prediction as to whether a terrorist event is going to occur or not.   
                                                 
5 Three additional Middle East security events, which are similar in many ways to the terrorist events 
included in this analysis but do not qualify as terrorist events by the criteria employed, were also 
preceded by sharp declines in crude oil prices.  These are: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, 
the assassination attempt on George HW Bush in April 1993, and the ambush of American troops in 
Mogadishu Somalia in October 1993 (this is the “Black Hawk Down” incident, and was, some believe, 
supported by Al Qaida operatives).  Furthermore, not included are numerous kidnappings of individual 
Americans that occurred in Lebanon during the period between 1982 and 1987, which coincided with 
the long oil price recession of the mid-1980s. 
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To this end, we want to estimate the following equation that specifies the 
potential relationship between a change in the oil prices and the occurrence of a 
terrorist event:  0 1
k
t t tE Pβ β ε= + + . 
As described above, Et is a dummy variable coded 1 for a month of interest t 
in which a qualifying terrorist event occurs, and zero otherwise.  Ptk is, as defined 
above, the change in the real oil price of Persian Gulf crude between an observation at 
time t and horizon k.  With a dichotomous variable as the dependent variable, it is 
appropriate to use logistic regression to estimate this relationship.  Here, the logit is 
solved via the method of maximum likelihood, Huber-White robust standard errors 
are calculated, and a Z-statistic is estimated based on these parameters.  This Z-
statistic can be used to test the probability that the null hypothesis – the β1 coefficient 
is equal to zero – is true given the data.6 
Table 1.3a provides a summary of the results for various versions of this logit.  
The logit coefficients listed in this table correspond to the β1 values from the 
regressions over various price change horizons (k).  Here, the β1 values have been 
exponentiated to provide the odds ratio interpretation of the logit coefficient. If this 
coefficient has a value greater than one, it implies that the higher prices are at time k 
relative to the reference month – or equivalently, the more prices fell over the k 
months preceding a month of interest – the greater the odds of an event occurring.  
                                                 
6 As one would expect, employing a probit specification yields virtually identical results, but the logit 
permits the convenient odds ratio interpretation. 
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More precisely, the values of these coefficients represent the change in the odds of 
attack from a 1% increase in the price difference over a given horizon.   
Table 1.3b manipulates these results further, estimating the marginal effect of 
changes in prices on the probability of an attack.  Each coefficient here represents the 
slope of the probability response curve implied by the logit, evaluated at the mean 
value of the price difference.7  For example, consider the results for Persian Gulf 
Crude prices at a nine month horizon.  The value of the marginal effect is 0.196.  This 
means that, compared to the case where the price had actually changed by its mean 
amount (which is a little greater than zero), if prices were actually 1% higher eight 
months ago this would increase the probability of an attack by 0.19 percentage points.  
By extension, a 5% difference increases the probability of attack by roughly one 
percentage point. 
There are two key results evident in Tables 1.3a and 1.3b.  First, the odds 
ratios are greater than one in every specification – and by extension, the marginal 
effects are greater than zero in every specification –  and are in general statistically 
significant at a level of at least 1% for time horizons between five and twelve months.  
As discussed above, values for the odds ratio greater than one indicate that the 
likelihood of attack rises if prices have fallen. 
We can see this result visually by using the logit models to calculate the 
probability of attack over a range of hypothetical price changes, and graphing the 
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results.8  Figures 3 and 4 graph some examples of the probability response curves 
implied by their respective logit results.  Here, the y-axis measures the probability of 
an event next month, given the change in log prices on the x-axis.  The upward 
sloping curves demonstrate the implication that the more prices fall over a given time 
period, the higher the probability of an attack next month. The slopes of these curves 
also offer a visual representation of the marginal effect of changes in oil prices on the 
event probabilities.  Due to the non-linearity inherent in a logistic regression, the 
slope of the curve becomes steeper as the difference in prices increases. 
The second observation from these tables is that in general over shorter time 
horizons the logit coefficients tend to be larger.  This suggests that given an equal 
sized percentage drop in prices over two different time horizons, the probability of an 
attack increases more for the shorter time horizon.  This is evident in Figure 1.3, in 
which the slope of the implied probability response curve is steeper for the shorter 
horizon measure.  
 
Of course, the variance in oil price changes is smaller over shorter horizons.  
A 15% change in prices over one month is more than two standard deviations of this 
series, whereas that same change over one year is roughly one-half standard 
deviation.  It is thus of interest to compare how sensitive the probability of attack is to 
                                                                                                                                           
7 This is roughly equal to zero for short horizons, and slightly positive for longer horizons (reflecting 
the fact that on average oil prices decreased slightly over the time period.) 
8 The implied probability q of the event given oil price change Pik is the solution to: ln(q/(1-q))= β0 + β1Pk. 
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changes in prices of comparable relative magnitude over different time horizons   To 
this end, a second set of regressions was run after standardizing each price series.  
These results are summarized in Tables 4a and 4b.  Note the Z-values are identical to 
those in Tables 1.3a and 1.3b, as one would expect after dividing each series by a 
constant term.  However, the interpretation of these coefficients is somewhat 
different, in that each coefficient now represents the change in the odds ratio from a 
one standard deviation change in price, rather than a one percent change in price.  In 
the case of Persian Gulf crude prices, the probability of attack next month is most 
sensitive to a one standard deviation change in prices over an eight month interval 
(that is, when k=9).  This standard deviation is a change in prices of approximately 
25% over this span.  
Visually, it is clear from Figure 1.4 that the probability of terrorism is more 
sensitive to the standardized change over an eight month interval than the two month 
interval, which is exactly the opposite conclusion that one would make from 
inspection of Figure 1.3.  Still, the differences in the slopes of the curves are not 
extraordinarily large, and are certainly not different from each other in a statistically 
significant sense.  This suggests that the rate of change in prices matters more than 
the magnitude of that change. 
With most time-series analyses, the fundamental concern is that there may be 
serial correlation.  In the context of this paper, we would have serial correlation if the 
recent history of terrorist activity has predictive power.  It appears, for instance, that 
events tend to occur in clusters. (That these clusters occur during oil price recessions 
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is a big part of what is driving the results.)  These clusters may lead the errors from 
the regression to be correlated with one another.  Not accounting for the history of 
events to eliminate the correlation would lead to bias in the coefficient on oil price 
changes.   
The traditional way to eliminate concerns of serial correlation is to include 
lags of the dependent variable on the right hand side of the regression equation. To 
this end, Tables 1.3a-1.4b also offer the results from a dynamic logit version, which 
includes 12 lags of the event dummy variable on the right-hand-side, in addition to 
our price change variable Ptk.  In none of these formulations to the 12 lags turn out to 
be even jointly significant – that is, the recent history of terrorist events has no 
predictive power.  While inclusion of the lagged event dummies absorbs some of the 
sensitivity of terrorist events to oil prices, it only does this to a small degree. The 
baseline results remain robust to this modification, suggesting that serial correlation – 
or, the clumping of events – is not a source of bias.  (See De Jong (2004) for 
discussion of the properties of these types of dynamic logits.) 
An alternative means of countering concerns about clustering is to remove 
from the data the observations from a suspicious cluster and see if the regression 
results are unchanged.  As mentioned, the surge in terrorist activity in the early/mid-
eighties – which coincides with deterioration in OPEC’s ability to maintain high 
prices – is a particularly striking feature of the data.  To determine if this cluster of 
events is indeed what is driving the overall pattern, I excise observations between the 
peak of oil prices in February 1981 and the trough in June 1986 from my sample.  
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Doing this cuts out 14 events, or about 1/3 of the total sample of terrorist attacks.  
Despite this, neither the direction nor the statistical significance of the results are 
substantially changed when rerunning the regressions over this time period (see 
Tables 1.3a and 1.3b).  This is further evidence that the apparent relationship between 
oil prices and attacks is independent of the recent history of attacks.  As removing 
data from one’s sample is rarely a desirable step, I will be using the full sample for 
the remainder of this piece. 
Another possible specification of interest is that there may be a nonlinear 
relationship between the change in oil prices and terrorism.  Do large changes in 
prices have an increasingly large impact on the likelihood of an attack?  Table 1.6 
offers an augmented version of the baseline univariate model that includes a term for 
the k-month percentage change squared.  The value for the squared coefficients is less 
than one at almost every horizon, suggesting that as the change in price gets larger 
and larger, the increase in likelihood gets smaller.  However, the squared change in 
price is only statistically significant for one horizon, suggesting that the linear 
specification is capturing most of the relationship.   
To get a sense for how the baseline empirical model functions as a predictive 
device, Figure 1.5 plots the probability of attack implied by one of these regressions 
(Persian Gulf Crude change over a nine month horizon) with vertical bars denoting 
actual event dates.  The model seems to do a reasonably good job.  Most of the 
periods where the predicted probability of attack is high are marked by one or more 
attacks, whereas relatively few of the low probability periods are marked by attacks – 
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and when attacks do occur during low-probability periods they are generally isolated.  
The only noteworthy “false positive” would be the period in mid-1991 when oil 
prices fell precipitously in the wake of the first Iraq war, yet there were no terrorist 
attacks.  Significant “false negatives” would have been two events in late 1979 – 
including the Iran Hostage crisis – the UTA airliner bombing in mid-1989, and the 
Bali nightclub bombing in late 2002, each of which occurred after periods when oil 
prices had risen significantly. 
4.2 Implications: Example Calculation of the Probability of Attack 
The relative changes in probability implied by these results are striking.  This 
is most readily apparent from the fact that the probability response curves implied by 
these regressions (Figures 1.3 and 1.4) are fairly steep.  A hypothetical numerical 
example can help emphasize this. Suppose we decide to look back in time at Persian 
Gulf oil prices eight months ago in order to try and gauge the probability of a terrorist 
event occurring next month (i.e. looking back nine months before month of interest).  
This particular specification is chosen because it appears (via the results in Table 
1.4b) that the likelihood of an event occurring is most sensitive to changes over the 
eight month horizon. 
As a baseline, suppose that prices are unchanged between today and eight 
months ago (Pt9=0).  The logit results indicate that if prices are unchanged then the 
probability of an event next month is about 11.2%.  (The 95% confidence interval for 
this result is between 8.1% and 15.1 %.) Now suppose, however, that eight months 
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ago prices were 20% higher than they are today.  20% is a slightly less than one 
standard deviation of the actual series of price changes over a nine month period, so it 
represents a sizeable, but not uncommon change in prices.  Based on the results of 
this logit, the implied probability of a terrorist event next month is 15.6% (95% C.I.: 
11.4% - 21.0%).  Similarly, if prices were actually 20% lower nine months ago than 
they are today, this implies a probability of attack of 7.9% (95% C.I.: 4.9%-12.4%).  
By extension, we can conclude that the probability of an attack is almost twice as 
great if prices were 20% higher nine months ago than today (15.6%) compared to if 
prices were 20% lower nine months ago (7.9%). 
Granted, even after this relatively large hypothetical drop in prices, a 15.6% 
probability of attack does not resolve terribly much of the uncertainty as to whether or 
not a terrorist event of this type is going to occur.  Still, given that terrorism is largely 
considered a political phenomenon, it is noteworthy that a basic economic variable 
such as oil prices can apparently significantly aid prediction at all. 
5 Discussion 
5.1 The Question of Causality 
If this statistically significant correlation between oil prices and terrorism is 
not merely a result of chance, then there must be some type of causal mechanism at 
work.  It should be stressed, however, that despite the statistical significance of oil 
price changes in the above regressions, this does not by any means prove that there is 
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a direct causal linkage between the two.  The above analysis is univariate, which 
implicitly assumes that oil price changes are independent of any other “terrorism-
causing” variables.  However, the changes in oil prices observed may not be random 
in this respect, and thus the possibility remains that there is some other variable that is 
both correlated with oil prices and also prompts higher rates of terrorism.9  That is, 
we may have omitted variable bias.  If this is the case, however, it may not diminish 
the value of these results in aiding terrorism prediction efforts.  After all, oil prices 
may be capturing the impact of such an omitted variable, and thus serve as a useful 
proxy.  An omitted variable problem would, of course, affect any policy implications 
of these results. 
Dealing with the omitted variable concern is non-trivial.  This is exacerbated 
by the fact that, to my knowledge, not even in the political science literature has 
attempted to approach a time-series of widely-varying terrorist events to look for 
common political or social causes that might serve as an omitted variable.  Analysis 
of terrorist activities generally take the form of scrutinizing a particular event or 
cluster of terrorist events (for instance, the violence in Lebanon during the 1980s) and 
looking into the recent past for political events that might have triggered that violence 
                                                 
9 Suppose, for example, that some pattern of behavior by Western Nations – perhaps political or 
economic pressure or military activity – contributes to a drop in oil prices, and also directly angers 
terrorist organizations and leads them to respond with attacks.  The above empirical results would be 
consistent with this scenario, but would the relation between oil prices and terrorism would not 
necessarily be causal.  Ehrlich and Liu (2002) do in fact argue that U.S. efforts to maintain oil supply 
stability (and by extension keep prices low) have in fact inflamed some Muslims. 
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(in this case, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and the increased presence of U.S. forces in 
Beirut in the aftermath).  Such an approach is entirely reasonable. 
However, for the purpose of ascribing common causes to a variety of 
disparate events, this type of analysis has at least one major shortcoming:  the 
political events that are deemed important triggers of terrorism are chosen only after 
the terrorist attacks take place.  That is, history remembers what “caused” a terrorist 
attack only if the attack occurs in the first place.  A political event that might a priori 
seem likely to spark violence but does not is quickly forgotten, whereas a similar 
event that is followed by a wave of terrorism will certainly be remembered and 
prominently recorded in history.  Therefore, constructing a time-series of important 
political events that may play a role in terrorism is likely to be extremely biased 
toward a collection of events that are, indeed, followed by terrorism.  This means that 
the β coefficient on a “political event” variable would be biased as well. (Assuming 
such a variable could be satisfactorily constructed in the first place.  Political history 
is a continuum that does not lend itself to quantitative pigeon-holing.)  This is 
essentially a measurement problem, and may explain why there are no time-series 
analyses of this sort in the literature. 
What are the implications of this discussion on the present analysis of oil and 
terrorism?  First is that if Middle Eastern political factors are indeed an omitted 
variable, it would be extremely difficult to establish this, and the measurement error 
could ultimately obscure any true relationship between oil and terrorism.  
Furthermore, remember that there are two requirements for there to be omitted 
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variable bias:  One is for the omitted variable to be correlated with the dependent 
variable, which is what I have discussed to this point, and the other is for the omitted 
variable to correlated with the independent variable in question – in this case changes 
in oil prices.  While political factors are almost certainly correlated with terrorism 
(even if it may be difficult to quantitatively establish this), it is far from clear that 
political events are linked with oil prices. 
Hamilton (see for example, 2003) is one prominent proponent of the argument 
that political events in the Middle East can trigger movements in oil prices.  The idea 
here is that major political events in the Middle East can either a.) interrupt 
production and lower oil supplies directly or b.) increase uncertainties in oil supplies, 
which boost precautionary demand.  Either of these outcomes will yield higher oil 
prices in the aftermath of these political events.  However, Barsky and Killian (2004) 
compile a list of many political events resembling the ones suggested by Hamilton 
that are not in fact followed by increases in oil prices.  While such evidence does not 
by any means close the door on possible systematic correlation between political 
events in the Middle East and oil prices, it does highlight the difficulty alluded to 
above in choosing relevant political events that might be important, and the bias this 
could potentially bring into the current analysis. 
5.2 Potential Causal Linkages 
For the remainder of the paper, let’s put aside this omitted variable concern.  
Doing so, we are left with the question of what causal chain might exist between 
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changes in oil prices and Middle Eastern terrorism against the West.  It would seem 
that we can quickly rule out reverse causality: that is, the causal direction must be 
from changing oil prices to terrorism, not terrorism to oil prices.  Due to the timing 
conventions employed here, the latter would imply that oil prices fall in anticipation 
of terrorism.  Given the potentially destabilizing effect of a Middle East terrorist 
attack on oil supplies, a priori one would expect that if the market “knows” a terrorist 
act is imminent, the price would be expected to rise. Oil prices falling in anticipation 
of attacks does not seem reasonable.  
Going in the other direction, I see at least two potential explanations for how 
changes in oil prices might contribute to the frequency of Middle Eastern terrorism 
against Western targets.  The first of these explanations, which seems more likely at 
this time, calls on the expected utility theories common throughout research into the 
economics of criminal behavior. In the other, falling oil prices directly stimulate 
certain agents to engage in or otherwise promote terrorism in an effort to interrupt the 
fall in prices.  In what follows I will informally describe these hypotheses, and 
discuss the merits and demerits of each.  While neither hypothesis is fully consistent 
with all the facts, they seem to be intuitively reasonable explanations for the empirical 
relationship we observe. 
5.2.1 Expected Utility Hypothesis 
Since Becker’s landmark article “Crime and Punishment” (1968), economists 
studying crime have usually sought to describe criminal behavior as being the 
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outcome of some rational decision process.  While Becker’s focus was in how 
negative incentives (i.e. punishments) might influence an individual’s choice as to 
whether to commit a crime, the basic approach has flavored criminal research more 
generally to this day.  According to this philosophy, a prospective criminal, when 
making the calculation of whether to proceed with his crime, considers the utility he 
expects to receive from the crime, and compares it to the utility he expects to receive 
from not participating. 
Consider an individual who, for whatever reason, is predisposed to commit an 
act of terrorism, but has not yet done so.  By predisposed, I mean that his utility 
increases (or he believes it will increase) as a result of becoming a terrorist.  As he 
goes forward and is deciding whether to actually perform a terrorist act, his 
deliberations might be interpreted in the above light.10  If his (subjective) expected 
utility from terrorism exceeds his expected utility from not engaging in terrorism (and 
instead engaging in legitimate economic (or non-economic) activities), we would 
predict that he would participate in the terrorist act.  We might down write this 
decision rule in a straightforward way as: 
0 0
0 0
: [ 0] [ 0] .t tt t
t t
CommitTerrorist Act if E U Terrorattack at t E U NoTerrorattack at tβ β
∞ ∞
= =
   = > =      
∑ ∑
 
                                                 
10 Sandler et al [1983] and Grossman [1991] build theoretical models terrorist behavior in a manner 
consistent with this philosophy, though the details of their approaches differ from the one suggested 
below. 
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At time 0, the prospective terrorist considers his lifetime stream of expected 
utility (discounted at some rate β between 0 and 1) in two states of the world: the 
world where he commits the terrorist act at time zero and the one where he does not.  
Now suppose we have a society of heterogeneous agents that follow this decision 
rule. While most individuals would never consider committing a terrorist act, for 
those that might be particularly inclined to terrorism (and have a large left hand side 
to this decision rule) – but have not yet felt compelled to – the right-hand side of the 
expression may only be slightly larger than the left. For these individuals, new 
information or events that either raise the value of the left hand side or lowers the 
value of the right hand side of their decision may trigger them to commit a terrorist 
act.  On average, we would thus expect a higher incidence of terrorism if either the 
left or right sides of the expression changed appropriately for that society. 
Note that it is possible that if there are no long-term repercussions from 
engaging in the terrorist act, (for instance, say the perpetrator does not expect to be 
captured or injured), then it follows that [Ut|Terror at t=0] = [Ut|No Terror at t=0] for 
all t>0.  That is, he can engage in legal activities for the rest of his life in the same 
way as he would if he hadn’t committed the terrorist act.  The opposite extreme 
would be the case of a potential a suicide-terrorist, who can no longer engage in 
activities, economic or otherwise, after an attack.11, 12 
                                                 
11 This does not necessarily mean that E[Ut | Terror at t=0]= 0 for t>0 in the case of the suicide bomber, 
as he may expect positive utility even in periods following his death. 
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In connecting this expected utility argument to changes in Middle Eastern oil 
prices, first note that the economic performance of many Middle Eastern nations is 
closely related to the price of oil.  This is most readily apparent from inspection of 
Figure 1.6, which plots the average annual (nominal) Persian Gulf crude price and the 
nominal per-capita GDP of a prominent oil-producing nation, Saudi Arabia.  The two 
series track each other well, with a correlation coefficient of about 0.8.  There is not 
an obvious strong trend to either series, so the correlation is not likely spurious. 
To the extent that an individual’s economic prospects are impacted by the 
ebbs and flows of the broader economy, one would expect a strengthening or 
weakening economy to raise or lower, respectively, the average person’s expected 
utility from participating in legitimate economic activities.  If, say, falling oil prices 
typically contributes to deteriorating economic conditions, as is apparently the case in 
oil producing nations, then an individual’s expectations of his own future economic 
well-being will often be tied to the price of oil.   
                                                                                                                                           
12 While some readers may recoil at the idea of ascribing any form of rationality to terrorists, from an 
economist’s perspective it seems to be a sensible approach.  Certainly, the behavior of terrorists, 
especially suicide attackers, would seem to mark the epitome of irrationality.  However, I would argue 
that what is more likely is that the decision to be a terrorist is rational, but only given a utility function 
that a non-terrorist would think of as being bizarre, or evil.  That is, the apparent irrationality of a 
suicide attacker actually results from the inability of a non-terrorist to comprehend what utility could 
possibly be gained by such actions.  To the prospective terrorist, however, the gains from terrorism 
may be perfectly clear.  It is in understanding an individual’s underlying motivations – or how a 
person’s utility function is formed – where economics usually breaks down, and this is no exception.  
Other disciplines, such as psychology, sociology, or political science, can aid in understanding how the 
terrorist inclinations are developed.  Given that these inclinations are there, however, the economist 
can then make inferences as to behavior, which is what I suggest below. 
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Even those not in the work force may feel the impact of falling oil prices, as 
unusually generous state-sponsored welfare programs – which oil-rich nations are 
famous for – will be under increasing pressures.  In Saudi Arabia, for instance, there 
is a significant linkage between the price of oil and government expenditures.  Figure 
1.7 plots this relationship since 1974.  The correlation over the whole time period is 
.30, which is non-negligible.  Since 1990, the correlation between non-defense 
spending and oil prices is even stronger, at .60. 
While this reasoning might hold well within oil-producing nations, it is less 
clear how a person in a Middle Easterner country that does not produce oil might be 
impacted.  The channel in this case could be changes in the level of charitable 
donations received by those in non-oil producing nations.  Many Muslims are 
annually required to pay Khums, a charitable donation to the needy equal to 1/5 of 
their income.  This includes income derived from mines or minerals.  Charitable 
flows out of the oil producing nations would thus be profoundly affected by changes 
in oil prices.  Those who receive those donations, primarily the poor, would in turn 
suffer during downturns. 
This proposed impact on charitable giving from lower oil prices is not merely 
conjecture.  Rooney (2006) views high oil revenues as being the primary source of 
funds to charitable organizations (both legitimate charities, and terrorist fronts) in the 
Middle East.   He argues that elevated oil prices leads to a large pool of charitable 
funds.  A report by the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (2004) reiterates 
the linkage between oil prices and charitable giving in the Middle East. 
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If a drop in oil prices impacts the area’s economies immediately through the 
channels suggested above, then a typical person’s economic outcomes will be 
negatively impacted immediately.  Even if the transmission mechanism between 
changes in oil prices to economic outcomes is a slow one, expectations of future 
economic wellbeing will be hurt by these falling oil prices.  In either case, the right 
hand side of the expected utility decision rule will fall, and for some individuals on 
the margin who are contemplating committing a terrorist act by using the above 
decision rule, this change may lead them to act. 
One might also argue for this expected utility theory from the other direction.  
That is, falling oil prices could also raise the left hand side of the above decision rule.  
It is well known that in many Middle Eastern nations there is significant underlying 
enmity towards the United States and other Western European nations.  In such an 
environment, as the price of oil falls and economic prospects deteriorate, this would 
increase the general level of frustration in society, and some of these anti-Western 
sentiments may more readily surface.  As this happens, the society as a whole may 
begin to view strikes against Western targets more favorably.  For an individual 
considering whether or not to commit a terrorist act, then even if he is not personally 
impacted by weakening economic conditions, we would expect that a social climate 
that views the terrorist activities more favorably would increase the expected utility 
from participating in such an act.  Such an explanation would seem to be consistent 
with findings of Atran (2003) who shows that suicide bombers are typically 
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motivated by social and institutional pressures, not necessarily personal economic 
pressures. 
In sum, whether it is by raising the utility from engaging in a terrorist act or 
lowering the expected utility from participating in legitimate economic activities, by 
this expected utility argument we would expect a decrease in oil prices to increase the 
number of individuals willing to become terrorists.  In such an environment terrorist 
organizations would be better able to recruit members, develop plans of attack, and, 
as frustration with the economy rises, may even garner (tacit or explicit) support from 
the local government or business community.  The perception that the West, 
particularly the United States, actively uses its economic and military power in an 
effort to control Middle East oil supplies may serve inflame anti-Western sentiment in 
the face of falling crude prices. (See, for example, Ehrlich and Jianguo (2002).) 
Turned around, the argument seems even more compelling: when oil prices 
are rising and many in the Middle East are prospering as a result, there will be less 
urgency or desire within these nations to rock the boat and strike Western targets at 
that time (risking military and/or economic reprisal), and less tolerance for those who 
desire to do so.  By the same token, when the local economies are doing well, the 
opportunity cost of committing a terrorist act – and forgoing legitimate economic 
activities – is larger. 
As mentioned, Atran’s (2003) central thesis – as well as Krueger and 
Maleckova’s (2003) – is that terrorists are frequently not those who are the worst off 
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economically.  First, I’ll note that, with the exception of those directly impacted by 
changes in flows of charitable giving, the expected utility argument does not talk 
about an agent’s overall level of economic well-being but changes in those levels.   
That is, in principal, poverty is not a necessary condition for an individual to be 
“tipped” into committing a terrorist act.  This distinction implies that the results here 
do not necessarily contradict the findings that poverty is not a good predictor of 
whether an agent is likely to commit terrorist acts. 
In addition, note that the expected utility argument requires there to be a 
strong, pre-existing anti-Western sentiment.  Clearly, if the utility derived from 
attacking a Western target is zero, then no matter how poorly the economy is 
performing or how low expected utility from legitimate economic activities may be, 
we would not expect any anti-Western terrorism to occur.  Indeed, many developing 
regions of the world experience economic downturns that do not result in increasing 
numbers of terrorist activities against the West.  It would seem that there is something 
special in the Middle East – where decidedly negative attitudes towards the West are 
coupled with fringes of violent Islamic Fundamentalism.  Under these conditions, an 
economic downturn may allow these sentiments to flourish, with higher levels of 
terrorism following.   
Recent empirical work by Blomberg and Hess (2002) and Neumeyer (2003) 
lends some support to this expected utility argument, as both cross-country studies 
find that deteriorating economic conditions leads to increased instability. While 
Neumeyer is focused on criminal behavior more generally, Blomberg and Hess’s 
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findings are directly relevant to this discussion, as they find evidence that argue that 
internal and external political conflict is considerably more common during recession 
than expansion.  They find that this linkage is particularly strong for developing and 
non-democratic nations, where the probability of conflict more than doubles.  A paper 
by Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana (2002) also directly tests whether the incidence of 
“terrorism from within” increases following recessions, and find that it does.  
However, the findings of the latter are that the connection between the business cycle 
and terrorism is only significant for high income democracies, which is not the 
pattern observed here. 
Krueger and Maleckova (2002) provide evidence counter to this proposed 
relationship between economic expectations and terrorism.  They find that six months 
prior to the September 2000 intifada in Israel economic expectations in the occupied 
territories were relatively high and unemployment relatively low.  That the intifada 
occurred after these favorable observations suggests that economics had little to do 
with the rising hostilities.  Unfortunately, the economic data they provide is not 
available closer to the actual initiation of violence, and given the volatility of the 
unemployment data shown, a rapid deterioration in economic conditions is not out of 
the question, especially given the bursting of Israel’s technology bubble and 
subsequent recession that began in mid-2000, only months before the start of the 
intifada.  Even Atran (2003) who in general is skeptical of expected utility 
explanations of terrorist behavior, concedes that there was at least one episode of 
increased violence in Israel that followed significant deteriorating economic 
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conditions amongst the Palestinians.  While Krueger and Maleckova do provide some 
time-series evidence on a positive relationship between GDP and terrorism levels in 
Israel during an earlier time period, they note that their finding is not robust to small 
changes in specification. 
Another significant drawback to this expected utility hypothesis is that the 
planning and preparation for a major terrorist attack may take place over a long time-
period.  The attacks on September 11, 2001, for instance, are believed to have been 
planned and prepared for over a period of years.  The individuals carrying out this 
attack doubtless decided to participate in it long before they knew what oil prices 
would be around September 11.  Therefore, while an expected-utility decision rule 
might have been in place for these terrorists, the price of oil near September 11 would 
not likely have been a factor in it.  For smaller-scale attacks – such as kidnappings, 
car bombings, gun attacks against restaurants or tourist groups –  that would seem to 
require less preparation, the argument still seems reasonable. 
Indeed, running the regression analysis of Section 4 on a sub-sample of “low-
preparation”13 events, the coefficients are even larger than on the full sample of 
events, suggesting even greater sensitivity for these types of attacks to changes in oil 
prices. (See Table 1.5.)  The same analysis performed on “high-preparation” events 
                                                 
13 There is inevitably some arbitrariness in the selection of “low-“ vs. “high-” preparation events, but 
an effort was made to break events into categories based on the author’s perception of the amount of 
planning that would be required.  For example, parking a car full of explosives next to an embassy is 
probably not going to require much planning, whereas an armed assault on a European airport probably 
required considerably training and preparation. 
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yields smaller odds-ratios, which, while still greater than one (that is, indicating the 
same pattern as for the overall) are no longer statistically significant, due to a 
combination of the smaller coefficients and the fewer number of events. 
The expected utility argument could be further bolstered by scrutiny of 
higher-frequency data on movements in output and incomes in Middle Eastern 
nations.  While the annual averages of per capita GDP cited in Figure 1.6 indicate a 
tight connection between oil prices and economic performance in the Middle East, 
using quarterly or monthly data could help determine whether the timing of changes 
in these variables mirrors that of oil prices, and might themselves be used in a similar 
way to help predict terrorist activity against the United States.  Data on actual living 
standards (say, a measure of median income), rather than the blanket average of per 
capita income, may also be illuminating, since the fluctuations in oil prices may have 
a differential impact on the various strata of the economic hierarchy.  Unfortunately, 
this type of detailed time series data is scarce in developing regions. 
Furthermore, if an environment of deteriorating economic prospects does 
indeed prompt higher levels of terrorism, we might be able to find similar trends in 
other areas.  That is, would we find that, for example, terrorist activities originating in 
Chechnya seem to be correlated with the economic travails of the former Soviet 
Union?  As mentioned above, Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana’s (2002) cross-country 
time-series results hint that we may, though their economic data (annual) does not 
lend itself to the higher-frequency, focused analysis performed here. While, as 
mentioned, Krueger and Maleckova’s (2002) cross-section results in Israel and 
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Lebanon suggest that poverty has little to do with terrorist activity, much of their 
analysis simply lacks the time-series dimension that would allow one to conclude that 
changes in the economic situation are irrelevant.  That is, the question is still open as 
to whether terrorist strikes against Israel are more frequent when material conditions 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip worsen. 
5.2.2 Business Practices Hypothesis 
Oil prices take a more active role in the second hypothesis for why oil prices 
and frequency of terrorism may be linked.  This is a simple, argument. When oil 
prices are falling, this is harmful to oil producing interests, who see their profit 
margins deteriorate.  Oil traders are sensitive to issues of political stability in the 
Middle East, as so much of the world’s oil supply comes from there.  Thus, some oil 
producers may reason that promoting the appearance of instability in the Middle East 
may help support higher oil prices.   Sponsoring terrorism against Western targets 
may be one way to accomplish this.  In other words, a terrorist attack can be thought 
of as a business response to deteriorating industrial conditions. 
On the one hand, this argument would seem to be immune to one key concern 
of the above expected utility argument – that long preparation times before major 
terrorist events makes it unreasonable to surmise that the participants are being 
influenced by oil fluctuations around an event date.  While a long planning period 
may still be required for major attacks like 9/11, the decision to proceed on a certain 
date could be made by the sponsors of the attack based on recent news.  That is, after 
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the training and planning for a major attack has taken place, the leadership can elect 
to proceed with the attack at relatively short notice in response to changing oil 
markets. 
On the other hand, if terrorism is indeed actively sponsored by oil-interests in 
an attempt to raise prices during downturns, it does not appear to have been an 
especially successful strategy.  Inspection of Figure 1.2 suggests that the downward 
trend in average oil prices prior to events does not reverse itself in the short-run 
following these terrorist events.  This finding is also reflected when scrutinizing price 
changes on an event by event basis (not shown).  In general, whatever direction oil 
prices were moving prior to an event is how they tend to move in the months 
following an event.  Another mark against this hypothesis is that by instigating 
attacks, particularly major ones, the sponsors risk military or economic reprisal that 
may lower profitability. 
It should be noted, however, that while the downward price trend is not 
abruptly reverse on average following these events, it does appear (in Figure 1.2) that 
on average the rate of decrease may slow following the attacks.  Also, since 
historically a large fraction of the funding for Middle East terrorist organizations 
comes out of some of the biggest oil producing states (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, 
Libya) a hypothesis of the sort that links terrorism to the oil industry should not be 
completely discounted at this point.  Scrutiny of futures market data may yet indicate 
a spike following events that suggests that oil prices move upward in the months 
following these terrorist events, which might allow oil interests “in-the-know” to earn 
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a profit.  Ideally, detailed data on the local oil industry’s costs and revenues could 
help determine whether or not the profitability of oil producers in the region tends to 
increase or stabilize in the months following terrorist events.  This kind of data is not 
likely to be forthcoming, however. 
6 Conclusion 
There appears to be a statistical connection between changes in real crude oil 
prices and terrorist strikes by Middle Eastern organizations against the United States 
and Western Europe.  Particularly, attacks are more common after prices drop than 
after they rise.  This connection allows us to use a logistic specification to deduce the 
probability of attack by Middle Eastern agents against the West based solely on the 
recent history of oil price movements.  The empirical model’s predictions as to 
whether or not a terrorist event will occur seems to do a good job qualitatively of 
describing the actual history of terrorist events of this type.  While the relative 
differences in the probability of an attack implied by the empirical results are large 
for reasonable changes in oil prices, the probabilities themselves remain small, and as 
such these results can only supplement efforts to anticipate terrorist action.   
While a univariate relationship alone cannot hope to establish causality, the 
findings here would be consistent with at least two reasonable causal hypotheses, 
particularly the standard philosophy underlying theories of the economics of criminal 
behavior.  At the very least, the results here call for further investigation of both the 
phenomena described here, and whether a pattern of comovements in relevant 
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economic variables and terrorist activities is demonstrable elsewhere.  It may turn out 
that where cross-sectional analysis has thus far failed to demonstrate a linkage 
between economic factors and terrorism, a time-series approach may yet succeed. 
   
 




Event Date Date Description
British Airways Hijacking 1 3/3/1974 Mar-74 British Airways flight to London hijacked by Arab National Yourth Organisation for the 
Liberation of Palestine.  102 Passengers aboard
British Airways Hijacking 2 11/23/1974 Nov-74 British DC-10 airliner hijacked at Dubai, UAE, by Palestinian Rejectionist front terrorists 
and eventually flown to Tunisia where a German passenger was killed. 
Attack on Orly Airport, France 1/19/1975 Jan-75 Arab terrorists attack Orly airport, Paris, France, seizing ten hostages in a terminal 
bathroom. Eventually the French provided the terrorists with a plane to fly them to safety in 
Baghdad, Iraq. 
Air France hijacking 1 6/27/1976 Jul-76 An Air France airliner is hijacked by a joint German Baader-Meinhof/Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine terrorist group and its crew are forced to fly to Entebbe airport in 
Uganda. Some two hundred and fifty eight passengers and crew are held hostage.
Lufthansa hijacking 10/13/1977 Oct-77 Four Palestinian terrorists hijack a German Lufthansa Boeing 737 and order it to fly around 
a number of Middle East destinations for four days.  All the ninety hostages are eventually 
rescued and three terrorists killed. 
Alitalia hijaacking 9/7/1979 Sep-79 3 Shi'ite Muslims hijack flight protesting disappearance of leader Musa-al-Sadr
Iran Embassy Attack/Hostages 11/4/1979 Nov-79 Iranian radicals seize the US Embassy in Tehran, taking sixty-six American diplomats 
hostage. 
French Lebanon Embassy Bombing 5/24/1982 May-82 Car bombing outside French Embassy, 1 employee and 12 others killed.
Attack on Paris Synagogue 8/9/1982 Oct-82 Abu-Nidal attacks on Paris Synagogue and Jewish Restaurant.  6 killed, 27 injured.
U.S. Lebanon Embassy Bombing 4/18/83 Apr-83 Sixty three people, including the CIA's Middle East Director, are killed and 120 injured in 
a 400 lb suicide truck bomb attack on the US Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon.  Islamic Jihad 
claims responsibility.
Beirut Military Compound Bombing 10/23/1983 Oct-83 Simultaneous suicide truck bombs on American and French compounds in Beirut, Lebanon. 
A 12,000 lb bomb destroys a US Marine Corps base killing two hundred and forty one 
Americans.  Islamic Jihad claims responsibility.
Attack on US Embassy in Kuwait 12/12/1983 Dec-83 US Embassy in Kuwait was targeted by Iranian backed Iraqi Shia terrorist who attempted 
to destroy the building with a truck bomb. The attack was foiled by guards and the device 
exploded in the Embassy fore-court killing five people.
Restaurant Bombing in Torrejon, Spain 4/12/1984 Apr-84 Eighteen US servicemen killed and eighty three people injured in bomb attack on restaurant 
near USAF base in Torrejon, Spain. Responsibility claimed by Hezbollah as revenge for 
March bombing in Beirut attributed to the US government.
Air France hijacking 2 7/31/1984 Aug-84 Islamic Jihad hijacks Air France jetliner out of West Germany and diverts to Iran.
Bombing of US Embassy in East Beirut 9/20/1984 Sep-84 Suicide bomb attack on US Embassy in East Beirut kills twenty three people and injures 
twenty one others.  Attributed to the Iranian backed Hezbollah group.
TWA Flight 847 6/1/1985 Jun-85 TWA Boeing 727 was hijacked enroute to Rome, Italy, from Athens, Greece, by two 
Lebanese Hezbollah terrorists.  Two thirds of passengers American.
Achille Lauro Hijacking 10/7/1985 Oct-85 Four Palestinian Liberation Front terrorists seize the Italian cruise liner, Achille Lauro, 
during a cruise in the eastern Mediterranean, taking more than seven hundred people 
hostage.
Bomb attacks in Paris 12/1985 Dec-85 Series of bomb attacks in Paris attributed to Hezbollah.
Attacks on Italian, Austrian Airports 12/27/1985 Jan-86 Suicide grenade and gun attacks against passenger terminals at Rome and Vienna airports 
by the Abu Nidal terrorist group results in sixteen people being killed and more than 100 
civilians injured. 
Berlin Discotheque Bombing 4/5/1986 Apr-86 Two US soldiers are killed and seventy nine American servicemen are wounded in Libyan 
bomb attack on a night club in West Berlin, Germany.
Pan Am Flight 73 Hijacking 9/5/1986 Sep-86 Hijacking of Pan Am fllight 73 out of Pakistan.  Attirubted to Abu Nidal.  3 Americans 
killed, amongst others.
Pan Am/Lockerbie Bombing 12/21/1988 Dec-88 Pan Am Boeing 747 blown up over Lockerbie, Scotland.  Agents from Libya deemed 
responsible.
UTA Airliner Bombing 9/19/1989 Sep-89 One hundred and seventy people killed when French UTA airliner explodes in mid-air over 
Niger. The French government issued warrants for the arrest of four Libyans. 
Table 1.1
Listing and Description of Qualifying1 Terrorist Events
January 1974 - May 2003
   
 




Event Date Date Description
WTC Bombing 2/26/1993 Mar-93 World Trade Centre in New York, USA, badly damaged by a massive bomb planted by 
Islamic terrorists. The car bomb was planted in an underground garage and left six people 
dead and more than one thousand people injured.
Belgian Relief Center Bombing in Iraq 12/13/1993 Dec-93 Belgian Relief Center Bombed in Iraq. 5 Killed.
Tour Bus Attack in Cairo 12/27/1993 Jan-94 Attack on tour bus in Cairo.  8 Austrians Wounded.
Saudi Arabia Military Compound Bombing 11/14/1995 Nov-95 Seven foreigners, including a number of US servicemen, are killed in bomb attack on US-
run National Guard training centre at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
Kidnapping of French Tourists 1/26/1996 Feb-96 Al-Aslam tribesmen kidnap 17 French tourists. (WHERE?)
Attack on Greek Tourists 4/18/1996 Apr-96 Greek tourists attacked in Cairo (CASUALTIES?)
Saudi Arabia Khobar Towers Bombing 6/25/1996 Jul-96 Islamic radical terrorists opposed to the western military presence in the Gulf region, 
explode a truck bomb next to a USAF housing area at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 19 
American servicemen and 385 injuring more.
Tourist Kidnapping in Yemen 1 3/4/1997 Mar-97 Yemeni tribesmen kidnap 6 German tourists
Tourist Kidnapping in Yemen 2 8/13/1997 Aug-97 Yemeni tribesmen kidnap 10 Italian tourists
Western tourists attacked in Egypt 1 9/18/1997 Sep-97 Egyptian gunmen attack tourist bus in front of Egyptian National Antiquities Museum in 
Cairo.  9 German tourists killed.
Western tourists attacked in Egypt 2 11/17/1997 Nov-97 58 western tourists killed and dozens injured in gun attack on party visiting historic 
monuments in southern Egypt. Attack blamed on Islamic guerillas after six are killed in 
shoot out with police. 
Tourist Kidnapping in Yemen 3 6/18/1998 Jun-98 Yemen tribesmen kidnap 9 Italian Tourists
Africa Embassy Bombings 8/7/1998 Aug-98 US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salem, Tanzania, heavily damaged by 
massive bomb attacks. In the Nairobi attack 247 people were killed, including 12 
Americans, and 4,000 injured. Ten people were killed and 74 injured in Tanzania incident. 
US in
Western tourists attacked in Yemen 12/28/1998 Jan-99 Yemini militants kidnap a group of western tourists, including 12 Britons, 2 Americans, 
and 2 Australians on the main road to Aden. Four victims were killed during a rescue 
attempt the next day. 
USS Cole Attack 10/12/2000 Oct-00 USS Cole bombed in Persian gulf by Al Qaida operatives.  17 soldiers killed, 37 wounded.
WTC and Pentagon Strikes 9/11/2001 Sep-01 Al Qaida operatives commandeer 4 airplanes and crash 3 of them into World Trade Center 
and Pentagon.  Both towers of WTC collapse, killing thousands.
Suicide bombing in Saudi Arabia 10/6/2001 Oct-01 Suicide Bomber in shopping area in Saudi arabia kills 1 American, injuring 2 American, 2 
Britons and 2 Filipinos
Bali Bombing 10/14/2002 Oct-02 Series of bombings in nightclub district of Bali, Indonesia, frequented predominantly by 
Australians and Western Europeans.  15 Australians killed, amongst others.
Riyadh Bombing 5/5/2003 May-03 Suicide bombers detonate explosives in American housing compounds in Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia.  8 Americans killed, 34 injured.
Note:
Source:
1The terrorist events listed above meet the U.S. government's definition of a terrorist event and, for the purposes of this paper, satisfy 3 additional criteria.  These are A) 
the apparent principle target of the attack was civilians or non-mobilized military personnel of Western Nations,  B) the attack was instigated by groups with Middle 
Eastern origins, and C) the attack was of significant size.  By significant size, I impose the requirement that at least 5 individuals are held hostage, kidnapped, injured or 
killed in a given event.
There are various sources of data for the events list above, including the Center for Defense and International Security Studies Database, the Almanac of Modern 
Terrorism, the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, and Mickolas (various years, Terrorism in the 1980s series).
Table 1.1 (Continued)
Listing and Description of Qualifying1 Terrorist Events
January 1974 - May 2003
   
 




Event Date 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
British Airways Hijacking 1 Mar-74 -23.02 0
British Airways Hijacking 2 Nov-74 -3.961 19.06 13.606 8.6246 8.5449 7.3017 4.4163 2.3758 -1.833 0
Attack on Orly Airport, France Jan-75 -4.622 18.399 12.945 7.9638 7.8842 6.6409 3.7556 1.715 -2.493 -0.661 0.4531 0
Air France hijacking 1 Jul-76 -0.906 0.8907 -2.617 2.5203 4.0891 2.0476 1.7729 1.2164 1.1181 0.7908 -0.037 0
Lufthansa hijacking Oct-77 -2.628 -2.825 -3.007 -0.535 0.5413 1.1396 0.5562 0.5914 -0.928 -0.398 -0.952 0
Alitalia hijaacking Sep-79 -35.11 -35.99 -36.07 -36.37 -32.53 -32.25 -26.6 -21.43 -19.88 -3.759 -1.093 0
Iran Embassy Attack/Hostages Nov-79 -41.48 -41.78 -37.95 -37.67 -32.01 -26.84 -25.29 -9.17 -6.504 -5.411 1.78 0
French Lebanon Embassy Bombing May-82 4.4401 4.8722 1.2571 0.5034 -0.135 3.1551 3.4294 2.4646 0.8431 -0.176 1.7664 0
Attack on Paris Synagogue Oct-82 2.6262 1.988 5.2779 5.5522 4.5874 2.9658 1.9467 3.8892 2.1228 -1.765 2.0177 0
U.S. Lebanon Embassy Bombing Apr-83 19.279 15.391 19.174 17.156 14.041 14.986 16.15 16.522 17.945 9.0588 4.5648 0
Beirut Military Compound Bombing Oct-83 21.038 21.409 22.832 13.946 9.4521 4.8874 2.5628 2.5311 2.803 2.7042 0.2993 0
Attack on US Embassy in Kuwait Dec-83 23.249 14.363 9.869 5.3042 2.9796 2.948 3.2198 3.121 0.7161 0.4169 0.8736 0
Restaurant Bombing in Torrejon, Spain Apr-84 3.9547 3.9231 4.1949 4.0961 1.6912 1.392 1.8486 0.9751 -2.157 -0.17 -2.631 0
Air France hijacking 2 Aug-84 5.5363 5.237 5.6937 4.8202 1.6877 3.6756 1.2138 3.8451 2.9823 2.2493 2.0355 0
Bombing of US Embassy in East Beirut Sep-84 2.8062 3.2629 2.3894 -0.743 1.2448 -1.217 1.4143 0.5515 -0.182 -0.395 -2.431 0
TWA Flight 847 Jun-85 14.312 12.276 14.707 12.679 10.393 9.3961 7.3109 8.8311 9.8556 7.2239 5.1735 0
Achille Lauro Hijacking Oct-85 9.1519 8.1546 6.0693 7.5896 8.614 5.9823 3.9319 -1.242 -6.028 -4.831 -2.896 0
Bomb attacks in Paris Dec-85 12.678 14.198 15.223 12.591 10.541 5.3671 0.5806 1.7781 3.7127 6.6086 5.5715 0
Attacks on Italian, Austrian Airports Jan-86 30.522 31.546 28.914 26.864 21.69 16.904 18.101 20.036 22.932 21.895 16.323 0
Berlin Discotheque Bombing Apr-86 75.147 69.974 65.187 66.385 68.319 71.215 70.178 64.607 48.283 19.261 2.3982 0
Pan Am Flight 73 Hijacking Sep-86 88.617 87.58 82.009 65.685 36.663 19.8 17.402 14.489 -2.202 -3.19 1.0466 0
Pan Am/Lockerbie Bombing Dec-88 25.639 16.26 16.732 16.74 19.089 20.456 15.573 10.326 6.4703 -2.965 -3.959 0
UTA Airliner Bombing Sep-89 -27.59 -28.58 -24.62 -10.22 -1.841 2.8677 6.8533 15.058 7.767 4.097 2.1049 0
Arco Chemical Factory Explosion Jul-90 11.822 9.7166 12.408 17.053 18.504 24.939 23.786 17.606 7.1129 -6.032 -10.55 0
WTC Bombing Mar-93 -4.07 7.0179 10.436 14.458 11.872 9.4657 8.1856 5.3833 -0.644 -3.274 -4.458 0
Belgian Relief Center Bombing in Iraq Dec-93 26.364 25.18 29.638 30.995 29.916 24.34 20.386 13.899 14.565 9.0553 8.3697 0
Tour Bus Attack in Cairo Jan-94 37.393 41.851 43.208 42.129 36.553 32.599 26.112 26.779 21.268 20.583 12.213 0
Saudi Arabia Military Compound Bombing Nov-95 2.0316 -0.138 6.6895 8.8002 10.12 15.781 11.485 3.8476 -0.003 1.5619 2.5448 0
Kidnapping of French Tourists Feb-96 -1.95 -0.63 5.0316 0.7348 -6.902 -10.75 -9.188 -8.205 -10.75 -5.267 -6.885 0
Attack on Greek Tourists Apr-96 -5.076 -9.373 -17.01 -20.86 -19.3 -18.31 -20.86 -15.37 -16.99 -10.11 -5.173 0
Saudi Arabia Khobar Towers Bombing Jul-96 -14.66 -13.09 -12.11 -14.65 -9.17 -10.79 -3.903 1.0314 6.2044 9.1048 3.7082 0
Tourist Kidnapping in Yemen 1 Mar-97 10.393 13.293 7.8968 4.1886 8.0617 12.567 18.313 22.423 21.547 18.74 13.212 0
Tourist Kidnapping in Yemen 2 Aug-97 22.06 27.806 31.916 31.039 28.232 22.705 9.4924 8.16 3.8123 1.8334 0.3578 0
Western tourists attacked in Egypt 1 Sep-97 20.867 24.977 24.101 21.294 15.767 2.5542 1.2218 -3.126 -5.105 -6.58 -6.938 0
Western tourists attacked in Egypt 2 Nov-97 28.474 25.667 20.139 6.9268 5.5944 1.2467 -0.732 -2.208 -2.566 4.3726 3.1353 0
Tourist Kidnapping in Yemen 3 Jun-98 46.094 45.736 52.674 51.437 48.302 38.448 33.79 22.411 18.744 13.765 7.1773 0
Africa Embassy Bombings Aug-98 52.2 50.962 47.827 37.974 33.316 21.936 18.269 13.29 6.7027 -0.475 -2.546 0
Western tourists attacked in Yemen Jan-99 42.504 38.837 33.857 27.27 20.093 18.021 20.567 22.861 27.445 22.244 11.225 0
USS Cole Attack Oct-00 -27.93 -23.65 -19.52 -9.952 -12.14 -14.71 -15.55 -10.21 -9.411 -6.833 -5.302 0
WTC and Pentagon Strikes Sep-01 32.447 26.099 20.892 12.979 8.0081 5.3653 3.0222 1.6949 2.6045 1.2929 1.1554 0
Suicide bombing in Saudi Arabia Oct-01 36.516 31.309 23.396 18.425 15.782 13.439 12.112 13.022 11.71 11.572 10.417 0
Bali Bombing Oct-02 -39.67 -44.94 -46.92 -34.93 -20.77 -9.042 -5.879 -5.118 -4.528 0.3334 3.1292 0
Riyadh Bombing May-03 5.529 6.1193 10.98 13.776 10.647 7.1298 10.77 18.317 26.216 27.711 21.296 0
Average for Event Months 12.4 12.3 11.7 11.0 9.6 7.9 7.0 7.0 5.0 3.7 1.5 0.0
Average for Other Months 0.3 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0
P-value for difference (t-test) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.21
Median for Event Months 10.39 12.28 10.71 10.70 9.03 5.67 3.84 3.85 2.70 1.04 1.16 0.00
Median for Other Months 2.02 1.18 1.41 2.21 2.16 1.77 0.94 0.87 0.91 0.39 0.31 0.00
P-value for difference (Pearson chi-squared test) 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.31 0.74 0.24 0.00
Number of events where price is 10% higher in 
month t-k than on reference date (month t-1) 21 21 22 21 20 15 15 15 10 8 6
Number of events where price is 10% lower in 
month t-k than on reference date (month t-1) 6 6 7 6 5 6 4 3 3 1 2
1 For an event occurring in month t, each cell in the table is calculated as ln(pricet-k) - ln(Pricet-1).
Source: Oil Price Data from Energy Information Administration, Terrorism Dates assembled from CDISS, Patterns of Global Terrorism yearbook, Mickolas.
Table 1.2
Percent Difference in Price k-Months Prior to Event Relative to Event Date1
Percent Differences in Oil Prices Prior to Terrorist Events
Real Price of Landed Persian Gulf Crude Oil
January 1974 - May 2003
   
 




Version 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
Univariate
Coefficient (Odds Ratio) 1.016 1.017 1.018 1.020 1.019 1.018 1.019 1.025 1.025 1.034 1.040
Z-statistic (2.67)** (2.76)** (2.77)** (2.88)** (2.88)** (2.65)** (2.64)** (3.08)** (2.42)* (2.48)* (1.28)
Including Event Lags (12 months)
Coefficient (Odds Ratio) 1.015 1.017 1.018 1.018 1.017 1.016 1.017 1.022 1.023 1.032 1.061
Z-Statistic (2.39)* (2.53)* (2.62)** (2.57)* (2.50)* (2.16)* (2.14)* (2.56)* (2.02)* (2.12)* (1.99)*
Dropping Interval 2/1/81-6/1/86
Coefficient (Odds Ratio) 1.01478 1.01726 1.01849 1.02103 1.02163 1.02026 1.02149 1.02659 1.02413 1.03749 1.0382
Z-Statistic (2.09)* (2.23)* (2.25)* (2.45)* (2.54)* (2.34)* (2.30)* (2.69)** (1.98)* (2.21)* (0.93)
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Z-statistics based on robust standard errors.
How to Read this Table:
Number of Months Before Month of Interest (k)
Each coefficient refers to the odds ratio associated with the specified independent variable in a univariate logistic regression.   This 
table thus represents 11*3=33 regressions.  For example, if we look at column 7 for the Persian Gulf Crude series, this is the odds 
ratio in the regression of our Event dummy variable on the percentage difference between the Persian Gulf price of oil in the 
reference month (which is one month before the month of interest) and the price of oil six months earlier.  A one percent increase 
in the difference between the oil price over this time increases the odds off attack by .019.
Table 1.3a
Summary of Logit Results (Odds Ratios)
Dependent Variable: Event Dummy
Independent Variable: Percent Difference of Real Oil Price in Given Month Relative to Reference Month
Based on Changes in Persian Gulf Crude Prices
 
 
Version 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
Univariate
Coefficient (Marginal Effect) 0.155 0.171 0.185 0.196 0.192 0.181 0.194 0.246 0.252 0.340 0.412
Z-statistic (2.77)** (2.86)** (2.88)** (2.94)** (2.89)** (2.65)** (2.63)** (3.04)** (2.43)* (2.48)* (1.31)
Including Event Lags (12 months)
Coefficient (Marginal Effect) 0.143 0.159 0.174 0.173 0.168 0.154 0.164 0.216 0.221 0.313 0.577
Z-Statistic (2.42)* (2.57)* (2.66)** (2.58)* (2.47)* (2.13)* (2.12)* (2.52)* (2.01)* (2.10)* (2.03)*
Dropping Interval 2/1/81-6/1/86
Coefficient (Odds Ratio) 0.126 0.145 0.16 0.179 0.185 0.176 0.186 0.227 0.211 0.32 0.346
Z-Statistic (2.20)* (2.38)* (2.41)* (2.60)** (2.62)** (2.38)* (2.33)* (2.66)** (2.00)* (2.25)* (0.96)
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Z-statistics based on robust standard errors.
Marginal Effects are calculated at the mean value of the price deviation, which is roughly zero for each variable.
How to Read this Table:
Number of Months Before Month of Interest (k)
Each logit coefficient refers to the Marginal Effect associated with the specified independent variable in a univariate logistic 
regression on the event dummy variable.   This table thus represents 11*2=22 regressions.  For example, if we look at column 7 for 
the Persian Gulf Crude series, this is marginal effect of a one percent increase in the six month price difference on the probability 
of attack next month. Here, this one percent difference increases the probability of attack next month by about .181 percentage 
points
Table 1.3b
Marginal Effect of Oil Price Changes on Terrorist Events (Implied by Logit Results)
Dependent Variable: Event Dummy
Independent Variable: Percent Difference of Real Oil Price in Given Month Relative to Reference Month
Based on Changes in Persian Gulf Crude Prices
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------(%)-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Version 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
Univariate
Coefficient (Odds Ratio) 1.657 1.695 1.693 1.703 1.646 1.558 1.558 1.632 1.522 1.477 1.250
Z-statistic (2.91)** (3.00)** (3.01)** (3.17)** (3.22)** (3.06)** (3.06)** (3.43)** (2.72)** (2.53)* (1.08)
Including Event Lags (12 months)
Coefficient (Odds Ratio) 1.50919 1.54458 1.57236 1.52773 1.47175 1.38904 1.38049 1.46896 1.38149 1.40565 1.4412
Z-Statistic (2.39)* (2.53)* (2.62)** (2.57)* (2.50)* (2.16)* (2.14)* (2.56)* (2.02)* (2.12)* (1.99)*
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Z-statistics based on robust standard errors.
How to Read this Table:
Number of Months Before Month of Interest (k)
Each coefficient refers to the odds ratio associated with the specified independent variable in a univariate logistic regression.   This 
table thus represents 11*2=22 regressions.  For example, if we look at column 7 for the Persian Gulf Crude series, this is the odds 
ratio for the regression of our Event dummy variable on the (standardized) percent difference between the Persian Gulf oil price in 
the reference month and the price of oil six months earlier.  If prices fall by one standard deviation over six months the odds off 
attack increase by .021.
Table 1.4a
Summary of Logit Results (Odds Ratios)
Dependent Variable: Event Dummy





Price Change Variable (i) 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
Univariate
Coefficient (Marginal Effect) 4.355 4.492 4.544 4.542 4.299 3.898 3.835 4.070 3.326 2.887 1.187
Z-statistic (3.05)** (3.15)** (3.11)** (3.19)** (3.16)** (2.99)** (2.96)** (3.21)** (2.49)* (2.21)* (0.64)
Including Event Lags (12 months)
Coefficient (Marginal Effect) 4.35 4.531 4.648 4.643 4.314 3.818 3.763 4.266 3.633 3.629 2.553
Z-Statistic (2.77)** (2.86)** (2.88)** (2.94)** (2.89)** (2.65)** (2.63)** (3.04)** (2.43)* (2.48)* (1.31)
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Z-statistics based on robust standard errors.
Marginal Effects are calculated at the mean value of the price deviation, which is slightly greater than zero for each variable.
How to Read this Table:
Number of Months Before Month of Interest (k)
Each logit coefficient refers to the Marginal Effect associated with the specified independent variable in a univariate logistic 
regression on the event dummy variable.   This table thus represents 11*2=22 regressions.  For example, if we look at column 7 for 
the Persian Gulf Crude series, this is marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in the six month price difference on the 
probability of attack next month. Here, if prices fall by one standard deviation the probability of attack next month rises by about 
3.9 percentage points.
Table 1.4b
Marginal Effect of Oil Price Changes on Terrorist Events (Implied by Logit Results)
Dependent Variable: Event Dummy
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Regression Version 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
All Events (43 events)
Coefficient (Odds Ratio) 1.016 1.017 1.018 1.020 1.019 1.018 1.019 1.025 1.025 1.034 1.040
Z-statistic (2.67)** (2.76)** (2.77)** (2.88)** (2.88)** (2.65)** (2.64)** (3.08)** (2.42)* (2.48)* (1.28)
"Small Scale" Events (22 events)
Coefficient (Odds Ratio) 1.019 1.021 1.023 1.022 1.023 1.022 1.024 1.031 1.039 1.058 1.102
Z-Statistic (2.96)** (2.94)** (2.91)** (2.71)** (2.79)** (2.54)* (2.60)** (2.92)** (2.79)** (3.14)** (2.84)**
"Large Scale" Events (21 events)
Coefficient (Odds Ratio) 1.00595 1.00729 1.00751 1.0106 1.00974 1.00968 1.01009 1.0136 1.00349 0.99783 0.96395
Z-Statistic (0.68) (0.78) (0.82) (1.24) (1.28) (1.29) (1.27) (1.74) (0.37) (0.17) (1.02)
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Z-statistics in parenthesis based on robust standard errors.




Sub-category that includes events that would seem to have relatively long preparation times, such as airline hijackings, massive 
bombings, or gun-attacks against secured facilities (airports, embassies outside the middle east).
Number of Months Before Month of Interest (k)
Sub-category that includes events that would seem to have relatively short preparation times, such as suicide car bombings, or gun 
attacks on un-fortified targets in the Middle East (tourist groups or museums).
Summary of Logit Results For Selected Subsets of Terrorist Events
Dependent Variable: Event Dummy





Variable 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
 
Oil Price Change 1.01781 1.01945 1.02097 1.02601 1.03028 1.02906 1.03076 1.04378 1.03716 1.05779 1.03157
Z-statistic (2.24)* (2.09)* (2.06)* (2.18)* (2.35)* (2.27)* (2.26)* (2.77)** (2.31)* (2.75)** (1.16)
Oil Price Change Squared 0.99993 0.99994 0.99993 0.99983 0.99967 0.99962 0.99957 0.99931 0.99944 0.99865 1.0014
Z-Statistic (0.52) (0.41) (0.43) (0.95) (1.51) (1.40) (1.25) (1.39) (1.31) (2.26)* (0.91)
Notes: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Z-statistics based on robust standard errors.
How to Read this Table:
Independent Variable: Percent Difference of Real Oil Price in Given Month Relative to Reference Month
Number of Months Before Month of Interest (k)
Each column reflects a single multivariate logit, including as independent variables the percentage change in oil price over 
horizon k, and the squared change in price over that same interval.
Table 1.6
Alternative Specification: Including Squared Change in Oil Price (Odds Ratios)
Dependent Variable: Event Dummy
 
Figure 1.1
Plot of Real Persian Gulf Crude Price and Terrorist Event Dates
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Figure 1.2
Average Percent Difference in Real Persian Gulf Oil Price 
Relative to Reference Month
Event Months vs. Non-Event Months
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Figure 1.4
Predicted Probability of Terrorist Attack ''Next Month''
Figure 1.5
Implied Probability of Attack and Actual Terrorist Event Dates
Based on Logit of Persian Gulf Crude Prices changes at 9-Month Horizon
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One for Some or One for All? 




We document a very robust empirical phenomenon: both the US Federal 
Reserve and the European Central Bank appear to set interest rates partly 
in response to regional disparities in unemployment rates.  This result is 
exceedingly robust – particularly for the US – even after controlling for 
a wide variety of factors, including the central bank’s information set 
and a battery of explanatory variables.  Furthermore, including measures 
of inter-regional unemployment dispersion in Taylor rule estimates 
greatly improves the identification of the central banks’ responses to 
aggregate inflation and unemployment rates.  Moreover, inclusion of the 
variance of unemployment across regions brings each bank’s policies 
with respect to macroeconomic aggregates into alignment with each 
other. We propose three models in which central bank policymaking is 
influenced by disparities across regions.   Testing specific implications 
of these models suggest that each bank’s approach to policy may differ 
in fundamental ways. 
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1 Introduction 
The traditional approach to monetary policy research focuses on aggregate measures 
of economic variables.  Inflation, output, unemployment, productivity, and other 
components of these policy models are typically considered across the economy as a 
whole.  As the monetary policy instrument – typically the interest rate chosen by the 
central bank – applies uniformly across the economy, perhaps the tendency to focus 
on aggregate measures of economic performance is a natural one.  Certainly, written 
statements from the central banks themselves do not contradict this approach.  
Reviewing the minutes from a typical U.S. Federal Reserve Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) meeting, for example, there is essentially no mention of differences in 
economic performance across regions of the country.  The Federal Reserve Act itself 
further dictates that the FOMC’s policies should be made “with regard to their 
bearing upon the general credit situation of the country” (Federal Reserve Act, 
section 12Ac, emphasis added), and that the Fed’s objective is to support “the 
economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote effectively the 
goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates” 
(FRA, section 2A).   
Despite this, to conclude that inter-regional variation in economic activity is 
irrelevant to monetary policy in practice may be premature.  Certainly, such variation 
is in the policy-makers’ information set.  In the weeks prior to each FOMC meeting, 
the Federal Reserve Board releases the Beige Book, an informal survey of economic 
trends in different parts of the country.  Much of the content of the Beige Book’s 
summary compares the state of the economy across the differing regions.  
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Furthermore, at any time, five of the members of the FOMC represent reserve banks 
scattered across the nation.  That the Federal Reserve Act requires representation 
from different regions suggests that, at least initially, getting regional perspectives on 
the country’s economic performance was important. 
Further evidence on this matter can also be found in transcripts of FOMC 
meetings themselves.  While the brunt of each of these meetings is focused on 
economic aggregates, at some point in the proceedings the president of each member 
bank makes a short statement about the status of his region’s economy.  Topics in 
these presentations can range widely; from the outlook for certain industries, to 
housing prices, to labor market tightness.  The FOMC would likely not devote any 
time to sharing region-specific data if only aggregate information is of importance. 
The European Central Bank is unfortunately less transparent than the Fed.  
The ECB does not publish transcripts or minutes from the meetings of its Executive 
Board.  This makes it more difficult to determine the extent to which regional 
variation is considered in ECB policy.  However, given that the Eurozone is 
comprised of sovereign nations, it is not difficult to imagine that stronger national 
identity may lead to considerable attention being given to localized economic 
performance.  Dixit (2000) goes so far as to propose that the threat of exiting the 
Eurozone may lead to ECB policy that accommodates the needs of individual 
members. 
The question as to whether regional differences play a role in monetary policy 
is not purely an academic one.  It is particularly important in light of the recent 
tendency of countries to surrender their national central banks in favor of multi-
  57 
national ones. In these cases, nations have agreed to give up independent monetary 
policies in exchange for increased exchange rate stability with major trading partners 
and as a mechanism to credibly lower inflationary expectations.  Yet as central banks 
gain control of monetary policy over more heterogeneous economic entities, the 
pressure to respond to or accommodate off-cycle regions may rise.  For example, with 
Central and East European countries being considered for admission to the Euro-Zone, 
the degree of heterogeneity in regional welfare would likely increase for the European 
Central Bank.  Additionally, the formation of a central bank and common currency 
for the entire continent of Africa is on the horizon.   
In light of these concerns, we first turn to the data to see if there is any 
evidence of central bank sensitivity to such heterogeneity. Our empirical analysis 
is in the spirit of Taylor (1993), who found that the Federal Reserve’s interest rate 
could be adequately represented via a simple rule in which interest rates change 
mechanically with various aggregate variables, empirical work has treated Taylor 
rules as a baseline for modeling a central bank’s behavior.1  Our own empirical 
model is essentially an augmented Taylor rule, which incorporates inter-regional 
variation in addition to aggregate measures of unemployment and inflation. For 
our baseline model we use GMM to estimate Taylor rules for the U.S. Federal 
Reserve and European Central Bank and test whether various measures of inter-
regional unemployment rate dispersion offers any additional explanatory power 
after taking account of expectations of future aggregate inflation and 
unemployment rates.   
                                                 
1 See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) for such an example focusing on whether the behavior of 
US Federal Reserve has changed over time. 
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Our empirical results strongly reject the null that these central banks do 
not respond to the inter-regional dispersion of unemployment rates.  The results 
hold for various measures of dispersion, such as gaps between high and low 
unemployment regions or the weighted variance of unemployment rates across 
regions for each period.  Appealingly, inclusion of the dispersion measures 
actually brings the aggregate policies of both the Fed and ECB into closer 
alignment with one another. 
We are concerned with confirming this new result. We begin by verifying 
that our findings are not a statistical anomaly.  For this purpose, we consider 
whether our results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of leading indicators 
and other economic variables that could be relevant to the central banks’ 
expectations for aggregate inflation and unemployment, such as stock prices, oil 
prices, and the PPI, and find that our results are largely robust to the inclusion of 
such measures.  Another concern is that our unemployment dispersion measures 
could help forecast future values of inflation and unemployment.  In this case, 
finding significant coefficients on the former could simply reflect a failure to 
adequately capture the central banks’ expectations of future inflation, output 
growth, or unemployment.  We address this concern in two ways.  First, we show 
that there is little evidence that our measures of regional heterogeneity are useful 
predictors of future values of the aggregate variables.  Second, we reproduce our 
estimates using Green Book forecasts of future aggregate variables from the 
Federal Reserve.  Thus, we can control for the central bank’s information set.  
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Even here, we continue to find an independent role for our inter-regional 
dispersion measures. 
As we are unable to explain away the result on a statistical basis, we seek 
an alternative explanation to that proposed by our theory.  We propose three 
theoretical models that may shed light on this surprising empirical finding.  In the 
first, we explore the implications of a central bank that dislikes disparity in 
welfare across nations.  In the second, we propose that each region has its own 
non-linear Phillips curve, whose slope is dependent on the magnitude of a region-
specific shock.  Lastly, we consider institutional factors that may contribute to this 
result.  In particular, that certain regions may be overweighted in the policy 
decisions of the banks, which contributes to the finding that regional differences 
matter.  For all these models, we evaluate the theoretical implications in light of 
the data to determine whether the models seem to be appropriate descriptions of 
the observed policy. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 contains the baseline empirical 
results that suggest that interregional heterogeneity does matter for policy.  
Because the result is so surprising, we make numerous attempts to confirm that 
the result is not a fluke, and that our analysis fails to account for the central 
bank’s full information set.  We are ultimately unable to make this result 
disappear.  Section 3 offers three new theoretical models in which interregional 
heterogeneity is relevant to the policymaker’s decisions.  Here, we also 
empirically test specific predictions made by each model.  Section 4 summarizes 
and concludes. 
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2 Baseline Results 
This section presents the baseline results of an empirical analysis that examines 
whether the Federal Reserve or the European Central Bank tend to respond to inter-
regional heterogeneity.  The results indicate that the dispersion of unemployment 
across regions is indeed an important predictor of Fed and ECB policy.  One of the 
more appealing features of the analysis is that including an unemployment dispersion 
variable actually clarifies each central bank’s responses to aggregate inflation and 
unemployment.   
2.1 Estimation strategy and data 
Given that interest rates are the primary tool used by these central banks in achieving 
their goals, policy-makers’ decisions are naturally modeled by an interest rate rule of 
the type proposed by Taylor (1993)  
                         
1
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Such a rule implies that interest rates rise by φπ (φue) basis points on impact when 
expectations of inflation (unemployment) rise by one percentage point.  Lagged 
interest rate terms are included to allow for interest-smoothing.  The i.i.d. (by 
assumption) error term εt represents monetary policy shocks.  This specification 
assumes that interest rates are set in response to current expectations of future values 
of the independent variables, capturing the well-known fact that monetary policy acts 
with a lag, forcing policy-makers to be forward-looking.    
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Because expectations are not always available, our primary estimation 
strategy will employ the additional assumption of rational expectations for policy-
makers, such that Etxt+j=xt+j+vt+j where vt+j is unforecastable using time t information.  
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where ζt consists of the monetary policy shock and the sum of rational expectations 
errors.  Thus, following from our assumptions, Et-jζt=0 for all j≥1.  Because future 
values of inflation and unemployment can be expected to be correlated with time-t 
monetary policy shocks, we follow Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and estimate the 
parameters of equation (2.2) by GMM. 
We use monthly data from January 1982 to September 2005 for the U.S. and 
from January 1999 to October 2006 for the Euro-Zone.  For the US, we use the 
effective federal funds rate as our primary measure of interest rates, the 12-month log 
percentage change in the CPI for inflation and the BLS series for aggregate 
unemployment rates.  For the Euro-Zone, we use the interbank overnight rate for our 
interest rate series, and harmonized aggregate inflation and unemployment rates.  We 
use a six-month forecast horizon, though the results are insensitive to this assumption.   
Throughout the paper, we allude to the inter-regional dispersion of 
unemployment rates.  In practice, we measure this dispersion in a variety of ways.  
The first is to compute the variance of the distribution of unemployment rates each 
month, weighted by the population share of each region (var(UE)).  We define 
regions in the US as each of the fifty states plus the District of Columbia.  For the 
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ECB, each region is one of the eleven member states.    In addition, for the ECB, we 
subtract the mean unemployment rate of each country between 1990 and 1998 before 
taking the variance to account for the fact that European countries have vastly 
different structural UE rates.2  Our second measure is to take the difference between 
the unemployment rates of the 90th and 10th percentiles of the time-t distribution of 
regional unemployment rates (UEP9010).  The second is a narrower band: the 
difference between the 75th and 25th percentiles (UEP7525).3   
Figure 2.1 plots interest rates, inflation, and aggregate unemployment for the 
US over our time sample, while Figure 2 plots our three measures of regional 
heterogeneity in UE rates.  The first thing worth noting is that these measures are 
broadly similar (all cross-correlations exceed 0.9).  All three track the aggregate 
unemployment rate, by rising in recessions and falling as aggregate unemployment 
falls.  This property fails in two instances.  The first is the 2000 recession: as 
aggregate unemployment rose with the recession, none of the dispersion measures 
changed in this time period, indicating that the last recession was borne similarly by 
all states.  The second occurs in 1986, when the price of oil fell dramatically.  This 
led to sizeable increases in unemployment in oil-producing states, which shows up as 
an upsurge in dispersion of unemployment rates with no commensurate increase in 
aggregate unemployment.  Figures 3 and 4 plot aggregate variables and our measures 
of unemployment dispersion respectively for the Euro-Zone.  Again, the three 
                                                 
2 All results for the US are robust to removing mean UE rates from each state.   
3 For the ECB, we again remove the average UE rate of each country from 1990 to 1998 before 
calculating the latter two dispersion measures. 
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dispersion measures are broadly similar.  Unlike with the US, these series are 
uncorrelated with aggregate unemployment. 
 To test whether these measures affect central bank decision-making, we 
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where the null is that β=0 and Dt is a measure of regional unemployment dispersion.  
As instruments, we will consistently use six lags of the RHS.4   
2.2  Estimation Results 
Our baseline results are presented in Table 2.2.1.  Consider first the results for the US 
(panel A), which exclude dispersion measures.  The coefficient on future inflation is 
positive and highly significant, but, surprisingly, the coefficient on aggregate 
unemployment is only marginally statistically different from zero.  The coefficients 
on lagged interest rate imply an important amount of interest smoothing (the sum of 
the coefficients is 0.98), yielding a long-run response to inflation of about 4, 
consistent with the post-1982 estimates of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000).  For the 
ECB (panel B), the degree of interest smoothing is once again high.  However, unlike 
with the US, our estimates point to the ECB responding strongly to unemployment 
rates but not the inflation rate. 
Including our measures of inter-regional dispersion does two things.  First, for 
both the U.S. and the ECB, it yields estimates of the Taylor rule that are more 
consistent with central banks responding to both aggregate inflation and 
                                                 
4 We use a Newey-West weighting matrix with a truncation at 6 . 
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unemployment rates.  For the US, this means the response to unemployment becomes 
negative and highly statistically significant, while for the ECB the response to 
aggregate inflation becomes statistically significant.  Second, each of the measures of 
UE dispersion enters the regression with a non-zero coefficient.  For the US, the 
positive coefficient implies that as the degree of heterogeneity in UE rates increases 
across regions, the central bank tends to raise interest rates.  For the ECB, the sign is 
reversed, indicating that increases in dispersion lead to interest rate decreases.5 
 This surprising set of results is remarkably robust and difficult to reconcile 
with standard models of monetary-policy decision making.  In the rest of this section, 
we explore the robustness of the result before turning to potential explanations in 
subsequent sections. 
2.3 Robustness 
As a first step to investigating the robustness of these results, Figure 5 provides a 
scatterplot of the US (weighted) cross-sectional variance of state unemployment rates 
against the orthogonalized component of interest rates.  A clear positive relationship 
exists regardless of the outliers that appear.  (These outliers are almost exclusively 
from 1982.)  Not surprisingly given this scatter plot, we have found the positive 
relationship between the degree of heterogeneity in states’ UE rates and interest rates 
to be quite robust to sub-sample analysis. 6   Unfortunately, given the short time 
                                                 
5 We also found similar results when looking at the dispersion of inflation rates, as well as for 
dispersion of real exchange rates for the ECB.  However, the inflation results were much more 
sensitive for the US, reflecting the fact that regional price level data is only at a monthly frequency 
for the four Census Bureau divisions.  The RER series for the ECB were very highly correlated 
with the UE dispersion measures, so we focus exclusively on the unemployment measures here. 
6 Sub-sample results available from authors upon request.  
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sample available since the inception of the ECB, no time-sample verification can be 
provided for the ECB. 
A second type of robustness check is to consider an alternative estimation 
approach.  Because GMM estimation may fare poorly in short samples, we estimated 
equations (2.2) and (2.3) by 2SLS.7  The results were qualitatively unchanged.  A 
third issue to be concerned about is whether our choice of interest rates is the correct 
one.  For example, the U.S. Federal Reserve chooses a target for the Federal Funds 
rate (FFR), from which the effective FFR may differ, sometimes for reasons unrelated 
to monetary policy.8  We reproduced the results of Table 2.1 using the target FFR for 
the Fed and the refinancing rate for the ECB and found nearly identical results.9  We 
also found that our results are insensitive to using the GDP deflator or the non-farm 
business deflator to calculate inflation, rather than the CPI. 
Another potential issue is the failure to correctly condition for the central 
bank’s information set.  To see this, suppose that the central bank’s forecasts of future 
inflation and unemployment rates contain much more information than is embodied 
in our instruments.  In this case, if dispersion measures are useful predictors of future 
aggregate measures, then they may show up as significant predictors in a Taylor rule 
simply because they are capturing elements of the central bank’s information set that 
we are not controlling for.10  We address this issue in three ways. 
                                                 
7 See Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron (1996) and Christiano and den Haan (1996) for discussions of 
how GMM estimators fare in short time-samples.  These 2SLS results are available from authors 
upon request.. 
8 See Romer and Romer (2004). 
9 These results are also available upon request. 
10 See Orphanides (2001) for a discussion of the importance of controlling for the central bank’s 
real time expectations. 
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 The first approach is to determine whether our dispersion measures appear to 
contain useful information for predicting future aggregate variables.  Figure 6 plots 
the dynamic cross-covariances of the weighted variance of regional unemployment 
rates each month against leads and lags of aggregate inflation and unemployment 
rates for the U.S. and the ECB over the time periods used for the empirical analysis.11  
For both the U.S and the Euro-Area., there is little evidence that regional dispersion 
in unemployment rates tends to lead aggregate measures, instead the opposite appears 
to be true.  Both high inflation and high aggregate unemployment rates tend to be 
followed by increased dispersion of unemployment rates across states.  Granger 
Causality tests, presented in Table 2.3, tell a similar story.  For the US, we cannot 
reject the null that the cross-sectional variance of unemployment rates does not 
granger-cause aggregate inflation and unemployment.  For the Euro-Area, we can 
reject the null for aggregate unemployment but not for inflation.   
 A second approach is to augment our Taylor rules with variables that are well-
known leading indicators.  Our test consists of augmenting equation (2.3) with 
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where Dt is one of our measures of regional dispersion of unemployment rates while 
LIt is the leading indicator added to the regression.  The results are presented in Table 
2.4, using the weighted variance of cross-sectional unemployment rates each month 
                                                 
11 Use of our other measures of regional dispersion of unemployment rates yields nearly identical 
results. 
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as our measure of dispersion.12   As forward-looking variables we use consumer 
confidence indicators, stock prices, WDI oil prices, PPI inflation, and industrial 
production.13  We also consider the case of a time trend.  For both the US and the 
ECB, none of variables eliminates the influence of the cross-sectional variance of 
unemployment rates.  Again, there is little evidence that the measures of regional 
dispersion of unemployment rates are capturing forward-looking behavior or 
information that is inadequately modeled.   
The third approach to control for the central bank’s information set makes use 
of the real-time forecasts of future variables that the central bank relied on to make 
their decisions instead of using ex-post realized values of these variables.  For the US 
Federal Reserve, Green Book forecasts are available for much of our time sample and 
provide expectations for the Fed, at the time of each meeting, of inflation, output 
growth, and unemployment in the future.  Unfortunately, this restricts the time sample 
to January 1982 until December 2000.  In addition, forecasts are available for each 
meeting only, so our time frequency is that of the meetings of the Board of Governors 
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12 The results are very similar using the other measures of regional dispersion of unemployment 
rates. 
13 For the US, these are specifically the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average, the spot price of WTI oil, and the PPI-all commodities index.  For 
the Euro-Zone, we use the Consumer Confidence Indicator of the European Commission 
Consumer Survey, the DAX German stock price index, and the Euro-Zone PPI all industries 
excluding construction index. 
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where it is the new Target FFR chosen at each meeting.  The expectations terms are 
the average Green Book Forecasts of expected inflation, output growth, or 
unemployment over the current quarter and the subsequent two quarters.  The lagged 
interest rate term is the Target FFR chosen at the previous meeting, and Dt-2 is the 
measure of cross-sectional heterogeneity in unemployment rates two months prior to 
that in which the meeting occurs. 14   We include expectations of output growth 
because these appear to play an important role in affecting interest rate decisions.  We 
use the two-month lag in the dispersion measure to ensure that these series are 
orthogonal to the error term, which captures monetary policy shocks, as well as to 
reflect the time lag involved in the release of unemployment rates.  Because all of the 
RHS variables are determined prior to the decision about the new Target FFR, 
equation (2.5) can be estimated by OLS.   
 The results are presented in Table 2.5.  The first column presents baseline 
results excluding unemployment dispersion measures.  The results are quite 
consistent with our priors about how the central bank sets interest rates.  The 
coefficients on inflation and output growth are positive and statistically significant, 
while that on unemployment is negative and also statistically different from zero.  
Adding our measures of dispersion has little effect on the coefficients on expectations 
of future aggregate inflation and output growth.  However, as in Table 2.1, the 
estimated response to expected unemployment becomes larger (in absolute value), 
more than doubling when the weighted variance of state unemployment rates is added 
to the regression.  The coefficients on measures of unemployment dispersion are still 
                                                 
14 We include only one lag of the target FFR because higher order lags are all insignificant and 
have no effect on other coefficients.   
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positive, as they were in the estimates presented in Table 2.1.  However, when using 
the percentile differences of the distribution of unemployment rates across states, the 
coefficient is only weakly (at the 10% level) significantly different from zero.  The 
variance measure, however, remains positive and statistically different from zero at 
the 1% level, indicating that even after controlling for the central bank’s expectations 
(and also losing many observations), the variance of state unemployment rates 
continues to be an important predictor of the Federal Reserve’s interest rate policy.15 
 
3 Possible Theoretical Explanations and Tests 
Why would one be surprised to find that central bankers respond to dispersion of 
unemployment rates across regions?  Consider the following simple representation of 
the central banker’s problem, based on Barro and Gordon (1983): the central banker 
has a loss function over aggregate inflation and aggregate unemployment  
    * 2 21 ( ) ( )
2 2 a a
L u uλπ π= − + −      (3.1) 
where π is the inflation rate, common to all regions, and a au u− is the deviation of 
aggregate unemployment ua from the natural rate of unemployment au .  Aggregate 








=∑ , and the aggregate natural rate of unemployment is defined in 
an equivalent manner.   The weights ωi are the population share of each region. 
                                                 
15 Because the ECB does not release forecasts used for each meeting, we cannot replicate this 
analysis for the ECB.   
  70 
 Suppose that each region is subject to an expectations-augmented Phillips 
Curve tradeoff between inflation and unemployment 
        ( )ei i iu u α π π ε− = − − +            (3.2) 
where εi is a region-specific shock.  Assuming the central bank can choose the 
inflation rate, the optimal policy is given by 







                              (3.3) 
This optimal policy accommodates both shocks to inflation expectations and the 
(weighted) average shock to the Phillips Curve.  Clearly, optimal policy is 
independent of all regional considerations once one conditions on aggregate measures.   
 This feature of the model does not just reflect the fact that the loss function is 
over aggregate variables.  Suppose the central banker seeks to minimize a weighted 
sum of regional loss functions 
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Such a loss function implies that certain regions may have a disproportionate effect 
on the aggregate loss function if they are experiencing large shocks.  Yet the optimal 
policy in this context is identical to (3.3).  That is, it is independent of regional 
considerations once aggregate variables have been taken into account.  We will refer 
to this feature of the model as aggregation equivalence, though it must be emphasized 
that this is observationally equivalent to the well-established certainty equivalence 
principle. 
In the context of interregional heterogeneity, three assumptions lead to this 
aggregation equivalence: the quadratic nature of the loss function, the linearity of the 
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Phillips Curve, and the equality of the weights in the loss function and population 
weights used to generate aggregate variables.  In the subsequent sections, we relax 
each of these assumptions in turn and consider the implications for optimal monetary 
policy.  The key question we are interested in is whether relaxing these measures can 
provide an explanation for our empirical findings.   
3.1 Central Bank Preference for Homogeneity 
We first consider breaking the quadratic nature of the loss function.  Woodford (2003) 
demonstrates how one can derive a loss function similar to those considered here by 
taking a second-order approximation to the utility function of the representative 
consumer.16  Taking a second-order approximation to the utility function imposes 
certainty equivalence on the consumer and the central bank, since it is the third 
derivative of the utility function that breaks certainty equivalence.  In general, higher-
order approximations to the utility function would break both certainty and 
aggregation equivalence on the part of consumers and the central bank.   
Rather than derive a higher-order approximation to the utility function, we 
follow a more tractable approach and consider the policy implications of a central 
bank that dislikes dispersion in regional welfare, in addition to wanting to maximize 
aggregate welfare.  The model that follows is appealing in that it nests the standard 
models of monetary policy-making that ignore regional differences in welfare.  The 
goal is to identify how the central bank should respond to regional dispersion in 
unemployment rates if it did care about minimizing such dispersion. 
                                                 
16 A key difference is that Woodford’s loss function includes the deviation of output from the 
flexible-price level of output rather than the unemployment rate.   
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 Suppose that the central banker’s loss function is now given by:  
 
2
2a i i i i i ii i i
L L L Lκω ω ω = + − 
 
∑ ∑ ∑   (3.5) 
The term κ represents the weight the central bank places on its dislike of 
heterogeneity.  When κ=0, the model collapses back to the standard case, with 
optimal policy given by (3.3).  When κ>0, the central banker wants to maximize 
aggregate welfare without imposing disproportionate losses on any single region.  We 
can show that interregional differences matter in this context – in particular, the 
second and third moments are relevant for policy. Specifically: 
 
Proposition 1: The optimal choice of inflation for the central bank (π*) that 
minimizes (3.5) subject to (3.2) for all regions is of the form 
 ( ) ( ) ( )* 2 2opt u i i uf skew u u gπ π σ σ= + −  
where ( ) ( ) 22u i i i a a
i
u u u uσ ω  ≡ − − − ∑ is the weighted variance of cross-sectional 
unemployment rates, ,  ,a i i a i i
i i
u u u uω ω≡ ≡∑ ∑  and f and g are continuous functions 
of this variance. 
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
 
This proposition shows that the optimal policy depends on the first three moments of 
the distribution of shocks across regions.  Because the second and third moments of 
the distribution of shocks are the same as the second and third moments of the 
distribution of unemployment rates (around their natural levels), the optimal policy 
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augments that of (3.3) with functions only of the variance and skew of regional 
unemployment rates.  In addition, we can show: 
 
Corollary 1: a) ( )2 1uf σ ≥ , with equality when κ=0 or 2 0uσ = . 










           c) ( )2 0ug σ ≤ , with equality when κ=0 or 2 0uσ = . 










 Proof: See Appendix 1. 
 
The first result in the corollary establishes that if one objective of the central 
bank is to minimize the differences in aggregate welfare across states or regions, it 
must respond more strongly to the determinants of optimal policy (aggregate shock 
and expectations of inflation) when the variance of unemployment rates is nonzero.  
Suppose all states experience a common shock that tends to increase aggregate 
unemployment with no change in the variance of regional unemployment rates.  In 
the case with κ=0, the central bank chooses to raise inflation to offset some of the 
increase in aggregate unemployment, because the loss function is quadratic in both 
inflation and unemployment.  If the cross-sectional variance of unemployment rates is 
positive, then some states have higher unemployment rates than the average state.  
These states suffer disproportionately from the increase in unemployment from the 
shock, again because of the quadratic nature of the loss function.  Thus, if κ>0 so that 
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the central bank has the additional goal of avoiding imposing disproportionate 
welfare losses on an single region, the central bank must raise inflation more than it 
would otherwise to accommodate the disproportionate loss suffered by high 
unemployment states.  The second result of the corollary establishes that as the 
variance of unemployment rates rises, this phenomenon becomes increasingly 
important as larger fractions of states have disproportionately large welfare losses. 
The third result indicates that the coefficient on the skew of the distribution of 
unemployment rates must be positive (when κ=0 and the variance of unemployment 
rates is nonzero).  The skew captures the asymmetry of the distribution.  When it is 
positive, there is a fat tail of high unemployment rates, whereas when it is negative 
there is a fat tail of low unemployment states.  States in the fat tails tend to suffer 
disproportionate welfare losses and therefore have to be accommodated by the central 
bank when κ>0.  The fourth element indicates that, holding the skew constant, an 
increase in the variance diminishes the response of optimal policy to the skew of the 
unemployment distribution.   
 These results are similar to the theoretical arguments laid out by Dixit 
(2000) and Fuchs and Lippi (2006).  They each consider the problem of an 
aggregate central bank trying to maximize aggregate welfare subject to the 
constraint that the regional members find it optimal to stay in the monetary union.  
They find that the central bank should respond disproportionately to regions for 
which the participation constraint is binding.  Thus, aggregate policy is affected 
by regional concerns above and beyond those embodied in aggregate variables.  
The approach considered in this paper naturally yields a similar conclusion but 
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can be applied to both the ECB and the Fed, whereas the notion of states exiting 
the monetary union is clearly inapplicable to the US. 
The baseline model is a straightforward approach to evaluating whether 
monetary policy seems to be influenced by interregional heterogeneity.  The model 
under discussion here – in which the Fed has a preference for less heterogeneity of 
welfare – has additional features that are not included in the baseline case.  
Particularly, this model indicates that the skew of the distribution is important, and 
that the actual policy will be linked to the “optimal” policy absent of any preference 
for lower dispersion.  Unfortunately, the optimal policy is highly nonlinear in the 
variance.  To better map this into our empirical approach, we take a first-order 
approximation to the optimal policy π*: 
   * var( ) ( )var( ) ( )
opt
opt ue skew uec ue skew ueπ φ π φ φ≈ + + +      (3.6) 
where ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2var( ) ( )1,   ' ' ,  and  0. optopt ue u u skew ue uf g skew gφ φ σ π σ φ σ> = + = >   This 
expression implies that the central bank should allow for higher inflation when the 
skew of unemployment rates is high.  The response to higher variance is more 
ambiguous since g’ is negative.  If the average skew of the distribution in negative, 
then higher variance of unemployment rates should be accommodated with higher 
inflation.  If the average skew is positive, the sign of the response is ambiguous, but 
generally non-zero.   
We thus augment our baseline model to incorporate these features. We treat 
the following as the desired interest rate rule when κ=0: 
 6 6 6
des
t t ue t ti ue vπφ π φ+ + += + +    (3.7) 
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and use the following estimating equation: 
 var , ,var( ) ( )
des
t t j t j i t skew i t t
j
i c i i ue skew ueρ β β ε−= + + + + +∑  (3.8) 
to estimate c, φπ, φue, ρj, βvar, and βskew, jointly.  This specification is appealing 
because it naturally nests the baseline scenario and allows us to test the specific 
hypothesis predicted by the theory. 
The null hypothesis (κ=0) is that βvar=βskew=0.  For the US, the mean skew of 
regional unemployment rates is positive, so the theory predicts βvar has an ambiguous, 
but generally nonzero coefficient.  For the Euro-Area, the mean skew is negative, so 
the theory implies higher variance should lead to lower interest rates.  For both the 
Fed and the ECB, the theory predicts that if κ>0, then βskew<0.    
The results are presented in Table 2.6.  For the US, the results are consistent 
with the theory.  Once we estimate equation (3.8) with both the variance and the skew, 
the coefficient on the variance is non-zero while that on the skew is negative.  For the 
ECB, the results are more mixed.  The coefficient on the variance is negative, as 
implied by the theory.  However, the estimated coefficient on the skew of 
unemployment rates is positive, which directly contradicts the prediction of the model.  
Thus, one might conclude that the data are consistent with the predictions of the 
model for the US, but less so for the Euro-Area.   
3.2 The Phillips Fan 
A second necessary condition for aggregation equivalence to hold is a linear Phillips 
Curve (PC).  One shortcoming of a linear Phillips curve is that the tradeoff between 
inflation and unemployment is unchanging.  In this section, we consider an alternative 
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Phillips Curve representation such that when there is a shock to the economy, the 
inflation-unemployment tradeoff actually changes.  A bad (positive shock to the PC) 
shock, for instance, will tend to increase unemployment.  However, with increased 
slack in the economy, it may be the case that looser monetary policy can be more 
effective than before.  That is, it becomes less costly in terms of inflation to lower 
unemployment in the face of a bad shock.  Conversely, if there is a good shock 
(negative shock to the PC) to the economy and markets are tight, higher inflation does 
very little to reduce unemployment.  In fact, a policy of lowering inflation will now 
increase unemployment by less than before, and may be desirable. 
The simplest way to model this idea is to assume that there is a linear 
relationship between the shock, ε, and the slope of the Phillips curve, α.  In particular, 
 ( )Cα γε= +     (3.9) 
where C is a constant, and γ≥0 is the degree to which the slope changes in response to 
a shock.  To prevent the Phillips curve from sloping upwards, we further assume 
(C+γε)≥0.  Note that the standard case with a constant slope returns if γ=0. 
With this new version of α, the Phillips curve is now defined as 
 ( )( ) eu u C γε π π ε− = − + − +   (3.10) 
A bad shock (that is, where ε is positive) simultaneously raises unemployment and 
makes it cheaper (in terms of inflation) to reduce unemployment.  While the Phillips 
curve continues to be linear in inflation, the slope changes with different realizations 
of the shock, as depicted in Figure 2.A. 
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In this environment, we refer to the set of all possible Phillips curves as the “Phillips 
Fan.”  One can easily show that Phillips Fan pivots through a single point in the 
fourth quadrant of the graph.  This is at the point (-C/γ, 1/γ). Note that at a realization 
to the left of this point, a bad shock actually makes feasible outcomes of both lower 
unemployment and lower inflation.  We rule out this “free lunch” possibility by 
assuming u u− ≥-C/γ, and π-πe ≤1/γ.  Equivalently, and more practically (as we will 
see), (1- γ(π-πe))≥0. 
Now consider the same loss function for the central bank as (3.4).  We show 
in Appendix 2 that:  







π λγ γ π π




  (3.11) 
This term is positive, given the no free lunch assumption of above (that is, (1-γ(π-
πe))≥0).  This indicates that as the variance of the shocks increases, so does the 
optimal level of inflation.  The regressions of Table 2.1 suggest that the Phillips Fan 






Figure A: The Phillips Fan 
  79 
U.S. tries to lower inflation (raise interest rates) when there is a variance-increasing 
shock.  For Europe, however, the results are consistent with the Phillips Fan story. 
One can further find the direct relationship between the variance of 
unemployment and optimal inflation.  We show in Appendix 2 that: 




σ γ π π λγσ λ γε
=
− − − + +
 (3.12) 
The sign of (3.12) is determined by the sign of the term 
2 2(1 ( ) )aCελγσ λ γε− + + .  Since by assumption λ≥0, this term will be negative only if 
2 21 ( )aCεγσ γελ
< − + .  Thus, while the central bank unambiguously responds to 
increased variance of the shock by raising inflation, the net result of the shock and the 
change in policy leads to an ambiguous relationship between inflation and the 
variance of unemployment.  This suggests that central banks with loss functions that 
place a relatively high weight on unemployment (large λ) will tend to demonstrate a 
pattern of lower inflation when the interregional variance of unemployment increases.  
Also, economies that display a relatively high level of interregional heterogeneity 
(large σε2) will also tend to show a negative correlation.   
In these cases, as the variance of the shock rises – that is, as the Phillips Fan 
spreads open – the monetary authority seeks higher inflation.  This drives down 
overall unemployment, and also drives down the variance of unemployment as we 
travel up the spines of the fan.  We can see this latter result when we think of the 
variance of unemployment as the distance between the spines of the fan.  Figure 2.B 
shows a hypothetical case where this distance has decreased following an increase in 
the variance of the shocks and the ensuing monetary policy adjustment. Neither the 
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US nor EU shows that tendency, as both show a positive correlation between inflation 
and the variance of unemployment (roughly 0.34).  That said, this is an interesting 
theoretical possibility, that may be relevant for monetary regimes that place a large 
value on deviations of output from the natural level, or if nations with a great degree 
of heterogeneity attempt to enter into a monetary union. 
                
 
 
Another test for the relevance of the Phillips Fan as a description of policy 
involves how the central bank responds to shocks in states with high unemployment 
vs. low unemployment (relative to their natural levels).  We show in Appendix 2 that: 
 2












       (3.20) 
Since the denominator is the same for all regions, the impact on policy of a 
shock to region i is an increasing function of the difference between unemployment 





Fan opening up with 





In principle, the overall variance 
of unemployment might fall after 
a variance-increasing shock. 
Figure 2.B: Hypothetical Response to a Variance-Increasing Shock. 
  81 
natural level will see a stronger response if that region experiences a shock.17  This is 
due to the increasing effectiveness of monetary policy after a bad shock hits: after a 
region experiences a bad shock, the central bank gets more bang from a monetary 
expansion than it could before.  With the tradeoff between unemployment and 
inflation shrinking, the new optimal level is with higher inflation than before. 
 To test this, one can break our percentile-based dispersion terms into two 
components: UEP9010=UEP90-UEP10=(UEP90-UE)+(UE-UEP10).  The first 
component is the deviation of high unemployment states (here the 90th percentile) 
from the mean, while the second is the deviation of low unemployment states from 
the mean.  Applying this decomposition to our empirical specification yields: 
    1 90, 2 10,( ) ( )
des
t t j t j t t t t t
j
i c i i ue ue ue ueρ β β ε−= + + + − + − +∑           (3.21) 
where the null of β1=-β2 is that the central bank responds in the same way to higher 
unemployment on the part of high and low unemployment states.  Note that by (3.20), 
the Phillips Fan implies that β1<-β2. That is, the central bank responds more 
aggressively to shocks to high unemployment than low unemployment regions. 
 Table 2.7 presents empirical results from applying this decomposition of 
dispersion to both the 90-10th and 75-25th percentile differences for the US and ECB.  
For the US, the first thing to note is that β1 is not significantly different from zero. 
However, the coefficient on low-unemployment states, β2, is positive and highly 
statistically significant.  This says that when low-unemployment states get even lower 
                                                 
17 Scrutiny of (3.18) reveals that if a region has unemployment sufficiently below the natural level, 
then a bad shock to that state actually lowers the optimal inflation level.  This unusual result is due 
to the nonlinear properties of the Phillips fan. 
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unemployment rates, the central bank raises interest rates more than what is implied 
by the change in aggregate unemployment rate.  In other words, the US Federal 
Reserve appears to respond disproportionately to shocks to low-unemployment states, 
which directly contradicts the predictions of the Phillips Fan.  The Wald tests confirm 
that we can strongly reject the null of equal responses to high and low unemployment 
states, but the direction of the failure is opposite that implied by the model.   As 
mentioned above, since the US pattern also seems to deviate from the policy 
suggested by equation (3.11), the Phillips Fan may not be appropriate description for 
US monetary policy. 
 The story may be different for Europe, however.  For the ECB, the coefficient 
on high-unemployment states is negative and highly statistically significant, implying 
that when high-unemployment states see their unemployment rates rise relative to the 
mean, the central bank lowers interest rates disproportionately.  For low-
unemployment states, the evidence is more mixed.  Using the 90-10th percentile 
decomposition, the ECB’s response to changes in a given country’s unemployment 
rates is the same regardless of whether that country unemployment rate is low or high 
(relative to the natural level).  However, when using the 75th-25th decomposition, the 
response to changes in unemployment in the high-unemployment country is indeed 
stronger than for the low.  Thus, the results for the ECB are consistent with the theory 
in one case, 75th-25th, but not in the other, 90th-10th. 
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3.3 Regional Voting Shares and Interest Rate Decisions 
As a final attempt to account for the apparent importance of unemployment 
dispersion in monetary policy, we examine the representation of different regions in 
the voting decisions of each central bank.  That the Fed and the ECB tend to respond 
differently to regional unemployment gaps raises the possibility that the central banks 
may, by institutional construction, weigh regions differently, and this is showing up 
through our dispersion terms.   
 To see how this could be, suppose that the loss function (3.4) is replaced with 






i i i i i
i i
L L u uλπ
= =
 = Ω = Ω − − 
 
∑ ∑    (3.22) 
where Ωi may be different than the population weight ωi for some i.  In this case, one 
can readily show that the optimal policy, given regional PCs as in (3.2) is given by 




i i i a a
i
u u u uλαπ π
λα =
 = + Ω − − − + ∑ .   (3.23) 
The optimal policy π* is equal to the typical optimal policy πopt plus an extra term that 
reflects the deviation of each region’s unemployment rate from the aggregate level, 
weighted by that region’s influence in the aggregate loss function.  A high 
unemployment state with disproportionately high voting power will induce the central 
bank to tolerate higher inflation than would be optimal if voting weights reflected 
population weights.18   
                                                 
18 Aksoy et al (2002) similarly argue that if some voting members focus on regional concerns, 
aggregate interest rate decisions can be sub-optimal because of majority voting. 
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 Why would one believe that the central bank could weigh regions differently 
than implied by their population weights?  Meade and Sheets (2005) providence that 
voting members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) respond 
disproportionately to their region of origin in their voting decisions.19  Meade and 
Sheets conclude that this is unlikely to affect interest rate decisions since regional 
differences would cancel out across voting members.  However, if voting weights are 
not equal to population weights, then regional biases may not cancel out, leading to 
policy function like (3.23). 
In the ECB, interest rate decisions are made by the Governing Council which 
consists of the twelve governors of national central banks and six members of the 
Executive Board, of which four are typically from the “big” countries: Germany, 
France, Italy, and Spain.  A majority vote decides interest rate policy, but no minutes 
or records of voting patterns are released.  In contrast, the Federal Reserve sets 
interest rates by a majority vote among seven Board members and five (rotating) 
regional Bank Presidents (Dominguez, 2006).   
  We first consider whether the composition of voting members of the FOMC 
and Governing Council of the ECB are representative of the population shares 
accounted for by each region.  For the US, we use data from Meade and Sheets 
(2005), which provides the voting decisions of each member of the FOMC for each 
meeting since 1982 out to 2000.  Each voting member is assigned a region of origin, 
including Board members.  Table 2.8 presents the fraction of votes accounted for by 
                                                 
19 Heinemann and Huefner (2004) provide similar evidence for the ECB. 
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members of each Federal Reserve District.  For the ECB, we present a similar 
breakdown by country from January 1999 to September 2005.   
 For the US, the Northeast, i.e. New England and New York, appear to be the 
most heavily over-represented regions in FOMC meetings.  Both districts 1 and 2 of 
the Federal Reserve have been the source of a disproportionate amount of voting 
Board members relative to their share of the population.  In addition, because the 
New York Fed always has a vote at FOMC meetings, it also accounts for a 
disproportionate share of voting done by regional presidents.  On the other hand, the 
Southeast (Atlanta-based) and the West (San Francisco-based) are the most under-
represented in voting decisions relative to their share of the population.  The 
Southeast is particularly unaccounted for in terms of voting Board members.  All 
other districts have accounted for a share of votes approximately equal to their share 
of the population.  Note that there appears to be no close relationship between voting 
representation in FOMC meetings and the average difference between regional 
unemployment and the aggregate unemployment rate.20 
 For the ECB, France, Germany, and Italy are heavily underrepresented in the 
voting decisions of the Governing Council of the ECB, despite each of them 
consistently occupying a seat on the Executive Board, in addition to their 
representation via their national central banks.  Most dramatically, while Germany 
accounts for over 25 percent of the Euro-Zone’s population, it only accounts for ten 
percent of votes cast.  Instead, the smaller countries, which each receive at least one 
                                                 
20 Because some districts account for parts of states, we had to arbitrarily place some states 
entirely within some districts and therefore exclude them from districts of which they are partially 
part of.  This was done only for the purposes of calculating unemployment rates per district.  See 
Appendix 2 for a complete description of which districts includes which states. 
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vote are over-represented relative to their share of the population.  Luxembourg, for 
example, accounts for little over one-tenth of a percent of the population but has cast 
about six percent of all votes in meetings of the Governing Council.  Interestingly, the 
over-represented “small” countries of the ECB have had much lower unemployment 
rates than those of France, Germany, and Italy (Finland is the only exception).   
 To determine whether our finding that dispersion measures of regional 
unemployment rates affect interest rates is due to the over- and under-representation 
of regions in central banks’ decision-making procedures, we construct a measure of 
weighted regional unemployment gaps, where the weights are given by the voting 
representation of each region, as implied by the optimal policy function (3.23).  For 
the US, we take the fraction of votes associated with each region on any given 
meeting of the FOMC and multiply these fractions by the difference between the 
(one-month lagged) unemployment rates of each region from the (one-month lagged) 
aggregate unemployment rate.  This yields a series with frequency given by Fed 
meetings.  For the ECB, we apply the same procedure using contemporaneous values 
of unemployment rates.  Because the ECB Governing Council meets monthly, this is 
a monthly series. 
 We then use the following equation to test whether including these measures 






t t t j gy t t j ue t t j i t i t t t
i
i E E gy E ue i D Dπφ π φ φ ρ β β ε+ + + −
=
= + + + + + +∑  (3.24) 
where Dt one of our measures of the cross-sectional dispersion of regional 
unemployment rates and Dtvoting is our new measure of dispersion using voting shares 
  87 
of each region.  For the US, we estimate equation (3.24) using Green Book forecasts 
of inflation, output growth, and aggregate unemployment by OLS from 1982:01 to 
2000:12 at the frequency of Fed meetings.  Both the dispersion measures are lagged 
one period to ensure orthogonality of RHS variables to error term.  For the ECB, we 
use ex-post values of inflation and aggregate unemployment and estimate (3.24) by 
GMM, as in Section 2, at a monthly frequency.21 
 The results are presented in Table 2.9.  The main feature of the results is that 
accounting for voting weights has almost no effect on the original results.  For the US, 
including voting weights does not alter the significance of our dispersion measures.  
In addition, the voting dispersion terms appear to have no predictive power for 
interest rate decisions.  For the ECB, only in the case of the difference between the 
90th and 10th percentiles of the unemployment distribution are our results affected. In 
particular, the coefficient on this dispersion term becomes insignificantly different 
from zero.  For the other two dispersion measures, our baseline results continue to 
hold.  The voting term is only significantly different from zero (at the 10% level) 
when using the 75th-25th dispersion measure.  In addition, the positive coefficient on 
this term is counterintuitive.  Overall, it appears that our measures of dispersion are 
not capturing institutional biases for and against various regions.  While regional 
concerns may have an effect on the individual decisions of voting members, as argued 
by Meade and Sheets (2005), these appear to have no aggregate effect on interest 
                                                 
21 We have to use different approaches because Fed meetings are not held monthly and we do not 
have ECB forecasts of future aggregate variables.  ECB estimates are insensitive to including 
industrial production. 
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rates and cannot explain why interest rates appear to systematically respond to the 
regional dispersion of unemployment rates each period. 
4 Conclusion 
This paper presents robust evidence that interest rate decisions of policy-makers are 
systematically affected by the distribution of unemployment rates across regions.  We 
find that this phenomenon appears to hold both for the US Federal Reserve and the 
European Central Bank.  While the signs on the coefficient for unemployment 
dispersion is different for each bank, an appealing feature of augmenting estimates of 
the Taylor rule with these dispersion measures is that they help more clearly identify 
the response of the central bank to aggregate inflation and unemployment, and make 
the Fed and ECB aggregate monetary policies appear to be more qualitatively 
consistent with one another.  
 We show that this result does not appear to be a statistical anomaly, 
particularly for the US.  Even after controlling for the Fed’s expectations via Green 
Book forecasts, or attempting to adjust for imbalanced regional representation on the 
boards, we continue to find a strong predictive role for the cross-state variance of 
unemployment rates.   
 This result is surprising because according to traditional theory and the legal 
foundations of these institutions, regional concerns should not affect interest rates 
decisions other than by their effect on macroeconomic aggregate variables.  Due to 
“aggregation equivalence,” even attempts that initially separate differences in 
unemployment across regions tend to collapse to the standard result in which only 
aggregates matter for policy.  We have made three attempts to break this aggregation 
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equivalence: based on the central bank disliking dispersion, nonlinear Phillips Curves, 
and accounting for regional representation in voting decisions. 
 The results for these theoretical explanations are mixed.  The results for the 
US are consistent with the central bank placing a penalty of regional differences in 
welfare, but this is not the case for the ECB.  On the other hand, non-linear Phillips 
curves, as approximated by our Phillips Fan approach, can partially account for the 
ECB lowering interest rates when the variance of the shocks across regions increases.  
Also, for the ECB, the differential response of the shocks to high vs. low 
unemployment states is consistent with the conjecture of the Phillips Fan..    Finally, 
we find no strong evidence that regional misrepresentation in voting decisions could 
explain our empirical results for either the Fed or the ECB.   
One conclusion that is consistent with these results is that the monetary 
policymakers in the US and ECB have a fundamental difference in approach.  The 
Fed may be more concerned with reconciling welfare differences across regions, 
while the ECB may cognizant of the differential impact of regional shocks on the 
overall effectiveness of monetary policy.  Further analysis, particularly as the Euro-
zone matures, could shed more light on the relevance of heterogeneity for policy.  
 The remarkable robustness of our results for the US is striking and not readily 
reconciled with simple deviations from a static model of optimal monetary policy.  
One tantalizing piece of evidence is the fact that the statistical significance of 
unemployment dispersion terms for the US seems to come from a disproportionate 
sensitivity of the central bank to low-unemployment states.  This could arise in a 
dynamic “bottleneck” model of inflation.  If low unemployment rates tend to lead to 
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production bottlenecks that place significant pressures on inflation, a central bank 
should raise interest rates disproportionately when low-unemployment states see their 
unemployment rates fall further.  Such a model would deviate from linearized New 
Keynesian models of inflation dynamics and would require taking seriously nonlinear 
features of the economy.   
  
 
Baseline (1) (2) (3) Baseline (1) (2) (3)
c 0.00 0.33*** 0.03 -0.02 c 1.17*** 3.00*** 1.96*** 2.79***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.25) (0.26) (0.35) (0.26)
φ π 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.10*** φ π 0.03 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.15***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
φ ue -0.02* -0.10*** -0.07*** -0.05*** φ ue -0.13*** -0.30*** -0.16*** -0.27***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ρ 1 1.32*** 1.25*** 1.26*** 1.27*** ρ 1 0.95*** 0.83*** 0.88*** 0.84***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
ρ 2 -0.34*** -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.31*** ρ 2
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Dispersion Measure: var(UE) UEP9010 UEP7525 Dispersion Measure: var(UE) UEP9010 UEP7525
β 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.13*** β -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.10***




Table 2.1: Does Regional Variation in UE Affect Interest Rates?
January 1999 - October 2006January 1982 - September 2005
Panel A: United States
Note: All estimates done by GMM with Newey-West weighting matrix, standard errors in parentheses.  Instruments include 6 lags of each variable (inflation, 
unemployment, interest rates, and additional variables when included).  Dependent variable is the interest rate, while φ π , φ ue , and ρ i  are coefficients on 6-month ahead 
inflation, 6-month ahead unemployment, and i  lags of the interest rate respectively.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by a ***, **, and 
* respectively.
Panel B: Euro-Zone
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Table 2.2: Decomposing the Variance of the Endogenous Component of Interest Rates
var(agg) var(D) cov(agg,D)
Dispersion Measure
UEP90-UEP10 87% 113% -100%
UEP75-UEP25 60% 69% -29%
var(UE) 114% 167% -181%
var(agg) var(D) cov(agg,D)
Dispersion Measure  
UEP90-UEP10 81% 38% -19%
UEP75-UEP25 79% 44% -22%
var(UE) 96% 51% -46%
Note: The table presents decompositions of the variance of the endogenous 
component of interest rates as defined in equation (5), but normalized by the 
variance of the endogenous interest rate component.  Var(agg ), var(D ), and 
cov(agg,D ) are the variance of the endogenous component of interest rates 
due to aggregate inflation and unemployment, the variance of the measure 
of regional unemployment dispersion, and the covariance of the two 
respectively.  Each expression is multiplied by relevant constants from 
equation (5).  The estimated coefficients used come from the results of 
Table 1. 
Fraction of Var(Endog) due to
Panel A: United States
Panel B: Euro-Zone
Fraction of Var(Endog) due to
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Table 2.3: Granger Causality Tests
F-Statistic p-value
United States
π  does not Granger-Cause var(UE) 1.68* 0.07
var(UE) does not Granger-Cause π 1.47 0.13
UE does not Granger-Cause var(UE) 1.48 0.13
var(UE) does not Granger-Cause UE 0.92 0.53
Euro-Zone
π  does not Granger-Cause var(UE) 0.47 0.92
var(UE) does not Granger-Cause π 0.62 0.82
UE does not Granger-Cause var(UE) 1.58 0.12
var(UE) does not Granger-Cause UE 2.26** 0.02
Note: Granger Causality tests done with 12 lags.  The var(UE) series is the 
weighted variance of regional unemployment rates each month.  Data is from 
1982:01 to 2005:09 for US and 1999:01 to 2006:10 for Euro-Zone.  Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by a ***, **, and * 
respectively.
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time     
trend
c -2.98*** 0.52 0.34*** 0.29*** 0.14* 0.44**
(1.15) (0.56) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.20)
φ π 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.13*** 0.07*** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
φ ue -0.03 -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.06*** -0.10***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ρ 1 1.25*** 1.24*** 1.27*** 1.26*** 1.23*** 1.26***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
ρ 2 -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.31*** -0.32*** -0.26*** -0.30***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
β 1 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.11***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
β 2 0.65*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.01** 0.01*** -0.0004













Production time    trend
c 1.72*** 1.27** 1.85*** 2.49*** 1.73*** 2.88***
(0.22) (0.60) (0.27) (0.27) (0.30) (0.26)
φ π 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.03 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.13***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
φ ue -0.16*** -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.17*** -0.29***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
ρ 1 0.83*** 0.84*** 0.87*** 0.84*** 0.88*** 0.84***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
β 1 -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.04***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.01) (0.004) (0.006) (0.01)
β 2 0.01*** 0.12*** 0.28*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.000
(0.002) (0.04) (0.05) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Sample
Note: All estimates done by GMM with Newey-West weighting matrix, standard errors in parentheses.  Instruments 
include 6 lags of each variable (inflation, unemployment, interest rates, the weighted variance of regional 
unemployment rates and the additional variable included).  Dependent variable is the Effective Federal Funds Rate, 
while φ π , φ ue , and ρ i  are coefficients on 6-month ahead inflation, 6-month ahead unemployment, and i  lags of the 
interest rate respectively.  β 1  and β 2  are the coefficients on the dispersion measure and the additional variable 
respectively.  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by a ***, **, and * respectively.
Panel B: Euro-Zone
Panel A: United States
January 1982 - September 2005
January 1999 - October 2006
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Table 2.5: Using Green-Book Forecasts
Baseline (1) (2) (3)
c 0.09 0.74** 0.18 0.20
(0.19) (0.36) (0.20) (0.24)
φ π 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.31***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
φ gy 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.15***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
φ ue -0.11*** -0.24*** -0.18*** -0.15***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
ρ 0.88*** 0.85*** 0.86*** 0.86***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Dispersion Measure: var(UE) UEP9010 UEP7525
β 0.19*** 0.13* 0.12*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Sample
Note: All estimates done by OLS with Newey-West HAC standard errors in 
parentheses.  Dependent variable is the target FFR chosen at each meeting, 
while φ π , φ gy , and φ ue  are coefficients on Green-Book forecasts of average 
inflation, output growth, and unemployment over current quarter through next 
two quarters.  ρ  is the coefficient on the target FFR from the previous meeting.  
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by a ***, **, 
and * respectively.
United States
Fed Meetings from Jan. 1982 - Dec. 2000
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Table 2.6: Testing whether Central Banks Minimize Dispersion of Regional Losses
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
c 0.33*** 0.15* 0.30*** 3.00*** 2.77*** 2.99***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.26) (0.29) (0.23)
φ π 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.15***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
φ ue -0.10*** -0.04*** -0.10*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.31***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
ρ 1 1.25*** 1.29*** 1.24*** 0.83*** 0.86*** 0.84***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ρ 2 -0.30*** -0.33*** -0.28***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
β var(ue) 0.12*** 0.16*** -0.05*** -0.03***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
β skew(ue) 0.04*** -0.03* 0.014*** 0.008***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.003)
Sample
Panel A: United States Panel B: Euro-Zone
Regional UE in Levels
Note: The table presents estimates of equation (13) in the text.  Estimates are done by GMM with New-
West weighting matrix, with a truncation of 6 lags.  The dependent variable is the interest rate.  φ π , φ ue , 
and ρ j  (for j =1 or 2) are the responses of the central bank to expected inflation, expected unemployment 
and lag j of the interest rate respectively.  β 1 , β 2 , and β 3  are the responses to the interaction term, the 
level of the variance of regional unemployment rates each month, and the skew of unemployment rates 
each month.  We allow for the variance and skew measures to be taken across regional unemployment 
rates as reported (in levels) and across regional demeaned unemployment rates.  Statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively.  Standard errors of estimates 
are in parentheses below coefficients.
Jan 1982 - Sep 2005 Jan 1999 - Oct 2006
Regional UE in Levels
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Table 2.7: Decomposing the Dispersion of Regional UE Rates
UE Percentiles: 90 th  and 10 th 75 th  and 25 th 90 th  and 10 th 75 th  and 25 th
c 0.08 -0.06 1.69*** 2.58***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.26) (0.29)
φ π 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.07 0.13***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
φ ue -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.24*** -0.26***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
ρ 1 1.27*** 1.23*** 0.88*** 0.86***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
ρ 2 -0.30*** -0.25***
(0.05) (0.05)
β 1 0.02 -0.10 -0.10*** -0.11***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02)
β 2 0.18*** 0.37*** 0.10** -0.05
(0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)
Wald (β 1 =β 2 ) 32.6*** 42.4*** 0.01 15.8***
Sample
Note: This table presents estimates of equation (14) in text.  β 1  is the coefficient on the difference between 
the 90th or 75th percentile of the regional unemployment distribution and the mean unemployment rate. β 2 
is the same using the 10th or 25th percentiles.  Estimates done by GMM with Newey-West weighting matrix 
(6 lags).  Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients.  Wald is the Wald test statistic of the restriction 
that β 1 = β 2 .  Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * 
respectively.
United States Euro-Zone
Jan 1982 - Sep 2005 Jan 1999 - Oct 2006
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Table 2.8: Regional Representation in Interest-Rate Decision-Making
District: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Share of Board Member Votes 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.08
Share of Regional Pres. Votes 0.06 0.20 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07
Share of Total Votes 0.10 0.17 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.08
Share of Population 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.19
Mean UE gap -1.1 0.1 -0.1 0.4 -0.7 0.2 0.3 0.1 -1.4 -0.9 0.3 0.5
Country: AU BE FI FR DE GR IR IT LX ND PR ES
Share of Total Votes 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.11
Share of Population 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.19 0.27 0.04 0.01 0.19 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.13
Mean UE gap -4.3 -0.8 0.7 0.8 -0.5 1.8 -4.0 0.5 -5.2 -5.1 -3.2 2.4
Note: US Federal Reserve Bank Districts are based in Boston (1), New York (2), Philadelphia (3), Cleveland (4), Richmond (5), Atlanta 
(6), Chicago (7), St. Louis (8), Minneapolis (9), Kansas City (10), Dallas (11), and San Francisco (12).  Members of the ECB are Austria 
(AU), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR, since Jan. 1 2001), Ireland (IR), Italy (IT), Luxembourg 
(LX), Netherlands (ND), Portugal (PR), and Spain (ES).  Data for FOMC votes is from Meade and Sheets (2005) and contains votes by 
Board members and Regional Presidents.  For the ECB, votes are of members of the Governing Council, which include Executive 
Board members and Presidents of each national central bank.  Mean UE gaps are average difference between regional unemployment 
rates and the aggregate unemployment rates, from 1982:01 to 2005:09 for US and from 1999:01 to 2006:10 for Euro-Zone.
Panel A: US Federal Reserve Bank Districts
Panel B: Members of European Central Bank
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Table 2.9: Does Regional Representation in Interest-Rate Decisions Matter?
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
c 0.81** 0.25 0.29 2.86*** 1.92*** 2.78***
(0.40) (0.31) (0.31) (0.53) (0.47) (0.52)
φ π 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.11** 0.10* 0.08**
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
φ gy 0.11** 0.14** 0.14***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
φ ue -0.25*** -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.27*** -0.20*** -0.23***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
ρ 0.85*** 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.85*** 0.91*** 0.85***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Dispersion measure: var(UE) UEP9010 UEP7525 var(UE) UEP9010 UEP7525
β disp 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.09 -0.05*** -0.03 -0.11***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
β voting -0.22 -0.16 -0.23 0.10 -0.13 0.20*
(0.49) (0.47) (0.51) (0.10) (0.15) (0.11)
Sample
Note: Estimates for the US are done by OLS using GreenBook Forecasts of future inflation (φ π ), output growth (φ gy ), and 
unemployment (φ ue ) with interest rates measured by the target FFR on data with frequency of FOMC meetings.  Estimates for 
ECB are done by 2SLS with 6-month ahead values of inflation and unemployment with interest rates measured by interbank 
overnight rate.  β 1  is the coefficient on each measure of the cross-sectional regional dispersion of unemployment rates.  β 2  is 
the coefficient on the weighted sum of differences between regional and aggregate unemployment rates, where the weights are 
the voting share of each region in the interest-rate decision process that period.  All standard errors are Newey-West HAC.  
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively.
Jan 1999: Oct 2006 (monthly)
Panel B: Euro-ZonePanel A: United States
Jan 1982: Sep 2005 (FOMC meetings)
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Figure 2.5: Scatter Plot of US Unemployment Dispersion and Interest Rate 






























Note: Figure presents a scatter of plot of predicted cross-sectional variance of 
unemployment rates (based on projection of instruments) against difference 
between actual interest rates and predicted interest rates using non-dispersion 
(predicted) RHS variables of equation (2.3) in text with coefficients from Table 
2.1.  Scatter plot is broken into four time periods, indicated by different markers.  
Each period, excluding 1982, has trend line plotted. 
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Figure 2.6: Dynamic Cross-Correlation of Cross-Sectional Variance of 
Unemployment Rates with Inflation and Aggregate Unemployment 
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Appendix 1 
Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1: 
Note first that minimization of (3.5) over inflation yields the optimality condition 
0ji ii i i j j j
i i j j
dLdL dLL L
d d d
ω κ ω ω ω
π π π
   
+ − − =   
   
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑     (A1.1) 
Combining (3.1) and (3.2), the first bracketed term can be represented as: 
 ( )( )2 22
e
i j j i j j i a
j j
L L λω ε ω ε αλ π π ε ε
 
− = − − − − 
 
∑ ∑    (A1.2) 
Differentiating (3.1) and combining with (3.2) we can also show the second 
bracketed term to be: 




ω αλ ε ε
π π
− = − −∑       (A1.3) 
Differentiating (3.1) and substituting the result, along with (A1.2) and (A1.3), into 
(A1.1) and rearranging yields, in terms of the optimal inflation level π*: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )22 * 2 2 2 2 *1 2
i ae e
a i i j j i a
i j
ε ε
α λ π αλε α λπ καλ ω ε ω ε α π π ε ε
   −
+ − − = − − − −   
     
∑ ∑
           (A1.4)  
which simplifies to: 
( ) ( ) ( )22 * 2 2 3 2 *11 2
e e
a i i a i i i i a
i i i
α λ π αλε α λπ καλ ω ε ε ω ε α π π ω ε ε
  
+ − − = − − − −  
  
∑ ∑ ∑
          (A1.5) 
 
Now note that the weighted variance of the observed regional shocks is given by 
 ( ) ( )2 2 2var i i i a i i a
i i
ε ω ε ε ω ε ε= − = −∑ ∑     (A1.6) 
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and the weighted skew of these observed shocks is 
 
( ) ( )
( )
3 3 2 3
3 3
3 2
                                         3 var
i i i a i i a i i a
i i i
i i a a i
i
skew ε ω ε ε ω ε ε ω ε ε
ω ε ε ε ε




  (A1.7) 
where the last equality makes use of (A1.6). 
 
Substituting both (A1.6) and (A1.7) into equation (A1.5) yields: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2
2 2 2 *
2 2




i a i a i
e
i
skewκαλα λ α λ κ ε π αλ ε απ ε ε ε
α λ κ ε π
 + + = + + + 
+
 
            (A1.8) 
Defining ( )1 var iκλ εΨ ≡ + , we can rewrite (A1.8) as: 






αλ κα λ π αλ ε απ ε+ Ψ = Ψ + +       (A1.9) 
Note that ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )2 22 varu i i i a a i i a i
i i
u u u uσ ω ω ε ε ε ≡ − − − = − ≡ ∑ ∑   
and      ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( )3 3i i i i i a a i i a i
i i
skew u u u u u u skewω ω ε ε ε − ≡ − − − = − ≡ ∑ ∑  




















( ) ( ) ( )* 2 2opt u i i uf skew u u gπ π σ σ= + −  
Note that ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 var 1 1  and  0i u uf gκλ ε σ σΨ = + ≥ ⇒ ≥ ≥ . 
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Appendix 2 
Now consider the same loss function for the central bank as (3.4).  
Substituting the Phillips Fan of (3.10) into the loss function and taking the first order 
conditions with respect to the policy π yields: 
0 [ [( ( )( ) )( ( ))]ei i i i
i
C Cπ λ ω γε π π ε γε= + − + − + − +∑                         (A2.1) 
 
Expanding and taking the summation where possible, this can be rewritten as: 
 2 2 2 20 [( 2 )( ) ]ea i i a i i
i i
C C Cπ λ γε γ ω ε π π ε γ ω ε= + + + − − −∑ ∑  (A2.2) 
By definition, the weighted variance of the shocks is given by σε2=∑ωiεi2-εa2, or 
 2 2 2i i a
i
εω ε ε σ= +∑  (A2.3) 
Plugging (A2.3) into (A2.2) and simplifying yields: 
 2 2 2 20 [(( ) )( ) ( ) ]ea a aC Cε επ λ γε γ σ π π ε γε γσ= + + + − − + −  (A2.4) 
Taking the total derivative of this term with respect to π and σε2, one can show: 







π λγ γ π π





This term is positive, given the no free lunch assumption of above (that is, (1-γ(π-
πe))≥0).   
Now, for the Phillips Fan given in (3.10), the variance of unemployment around the 
natural level is: 
 2 2 2(1 ( ))eu εσ σ γ π π= − −  (A2.6) 
The total derivative of this equation is: 
 2 2 2 2(1 ( )) 2 (1 ( ))e eud d dε εσ γ π π σ γσ γ π π π= − − − − −  (A2.7) 
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Solving (A2.5) for dσε2, and plugging it into (A2.7) leads to an expression for the 
correlation between the variance of unemployment and the level of inflation: 




σ γ π π λγσ λ γε
=
− − − + +
 (A2.8) 
Lastly, starting with the first order condition (A2.1), take the total derivative with 
respect to π and εi.  This yields: 
 20 [ ( ) ] [2 ( )( ) 2 ][ ]ei i i i i
i
d C d C C dπ λ ω γε π γ γε π π γε ε= + + + + − − −∑  (A2.9) 
Noting that the expression for the Phillips Fan (3.10) implies 
( )( ) ( )ei i i iC u uγε π π ε+ − = − − + , we can plug this into (A2.9) and cancel out the 2γεi 
term.  Rearranging, we arrive at: 
 2
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Appendix 3 
Data Details for Voting Measures 
A- States associated with each Fed District 
District 1: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
and Vermont. 
District 2: New York 
District 3: Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey.   
District 4: Ohio. 
 District 5: Washington DC, Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, West 
Virginia.   
District 6: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee. 
District 7: Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin.  
District 8: Arkansas, Missouri, and Kentucky.   
District 9: Minnesota, Montana, North and South Dakota.   
District 10: Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Wyoming, and New Mexico. 
District 11: Texas. 
District 12: California, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, 
Alaska, and Hawaii. 
Because districts typically include parts of states, this division only approximately 
captures the division of states across districts.  It was necessary to divide districts 
into states because employment data by month is only available at the state level. 
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B- ECB members of the Governing Council. 
Every nation has one representative through the head of its central bank.  Greece 
joined in January 2001.  In addition, the following were members of the 
Executive Board and had voting rights in interest rate decisions: 
President: Duisenberg (ND) from Jan. 1999 to Oct. 2003.  Replaced by Trichet 
(FR) in Nov. 2003, to present. 
Vice-President: Noyer (FR) from June 1998 to May 2002.  Replaced by 
Papademos (GR) in June 2002, to present. 
Members: 
Solans (ES) from June 1998 to May 2004.  Replaced by Gonzalez-Paramo (ES) 
June 2004 to present. 
Hamalainen (FI) from June 1998 to May 2003.  Replaced by Tumpel-Gugerell 
(AU) June 2003 to present. 
Issing (DE) from June 1998 to May 2006.  Replaced by Stark (DE) June 2006 to 
present. 
Padoa-Schioppa from June 1998 to May 2005.  Replaced by Bini Smagghi (IT) 
June 2005 to present.
  112 
References 
Aksoy, Yunus, Paul De Grauwe, and Hans Dewachter.  2002.  Do Asymmetries 
Matter for Monetary Policy?  European Economic Review.  Vol. 46:  443-469. 
Barro, Robert J. and David B. Gordon.  1983.  A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy 
in a Natural Rate Model.  Journal of Political Economy.  Vol. 91: 589-610. 
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler.  1998.  Monetary Policy Rules in 
Practice: Some International Evidence.  European Economic Review.  Vol. 42 
No. 6: 1033-1067. 
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler.  2000.  Monetary Policy Rules and 
Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics.  Vol. 115 No. 1: 147-180. 
Christiano, Lawrence J and Wouter J den Haan.  1996.  Small-Sample Properties of 
GMM for Business Cycle Analysis.  Journal of Economic and Business 
Statistics.  Vol. 14 No. 3: 309-327. 
Dominguez, Kathryn.  2006.  The European Central Bank, the Euro and Global 
Financial Markets.  Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Perspectives. 
Dixit, Avinash.  2000.  A Repeated Game Model of Monetary Union.  The Economic 
Journal.  Vol. 110: 759-780. 
Fuchs, William and Francesco Lippi.  2006.  Monetary Union with Voluntary 
Participation.  Review of Economic Studies.  Vol. 73.  Pp. 437-457. 
Hansen, Lars Peter, John Heaton, and Amir Yaron.  1996.  Finite-Sample Properties 
of Some Alternative GMM Estimators.  Journal of Economic and Business 
Statistics.  Vol. 14 No. 3:  262-280. 
Heinemann, Friedrich and Felix P. Huefner.  2004.  Is the View from The Euro-
Tower Purely European?  National Divergence and ECB Interest Rate Policy.  
Scottish Journal of Political Economy.  Vol. 51, No.4: 544-558. 
Meade, Ellen E. and D. Nathan Sheets.  2005.  Regional Influences on FOMC Voting 
Patterns.  Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking.  Vol. 37, No. 4: 661-677. 
Orphanides, Athanasios. 2001.  Monetary Policy Rules Based on Real-Time Data.  
American Economic Review, Vol. 91 No. 4.  Pp. 964-985. 
Romer, Christina D. and David H. Romer.  2004.  A New Measure of Monetary 
Shocks: Derivation and Implications.  American Economic Review. Vol. 94 
No. 4: 1055-1084. 
Taylor, John B.  1993.  Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice. Carnegie 
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy. Vol 39: 195-214.   
Woodford, Michael.  2003.  Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of 
Monetary Policy.  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 










In this essay, I suggest that simple economics models can often be 
successfully used in evaluating the role of emotional factors in decision 
making.  Particularly, I consider the implications for agents strictly adhering 
to the principles of constrained optimization.  I show that this “neoclassical” 
approach implies that emotions are a feature of agents’ utility functions.  I 
then present the basic theoretical apparatus of this model, and apply it to a 
wide variety of emotionally linked behaviors.  I find that there are many 
examples that seem to indicate emotions are affecting choices in a manner 
consistent with some of the less-obvious predictions of this purely 
neoclassical framework. While it is unlikely that the standard approach can 
hope to account for all behaviors, economic studies of micro-level behavior 
can benefit from, at least at the outset, a benchmark model that incorporates 
emotions in a neoclassical way. 
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1 Introduction 
Emotions are a fundamental feature of human experience.  Unless we happen to be 
suffering a specific sort of brain damage, we are all familiar with what the Oxford 
English Dictionary calls the “strong feeling[s], such as joy, anger, or sadness” that 
arise, not through a process of reasoning, but as a seemingly unbidden response to 
either an external stimulus, or our own behavior. 
Like all characteristics that develop through natural selection, emotions exist 
today because they, at least at some time, aided survival.  Just as the giraffe with the 
longest neck could eat more (and thus become stronger) than others in his herd, at 
some point along the evolutionary path the ability for some proto-humans to have 
feelings as varied as fear, love, happiness, or guilt gave those individuals an 
advantage in passing along their genetic material.  However, while it is clear how the 
giraffe’s neck allows it to pick off the highest leaves, the physical manifestation of a 
given emotion is far more subtle, if it exists at all.  Instead, an emotion will tend to 
benefit an individual only if it is able to modify the person’s behavior in a manner 
that promotes the transmission of genes to the next generation. 
It is this premise that underlines this essay: Human emotions exist, and they 
exist only because they are able to affect behavior.  While the advantages conferred 
by emotions far back along the evolutionary path may no longer be advantages in 
modern times, there is no reason to suspect emotions have become irrelevant in 
decision making.  Rather, our prior ought to be that emotions can and do continue to 
influence behavior.  The question for the social scientist to try and answer, is how? 
The field of Psychology has, perhaps naturally, taken the lead in the study of 
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emotion.  Economists have historically tended to ignore the role of emotions 
altogether.  Even those who attempt to analyze emotions often view them as 
corrupting the decision-making process (Loewenstein 1996).  Recent work by 
neuroscientists (Damasio 1994) suggest that in fact emotions can serve to actually 
improve decision-making, casting some doubt on the premise that cold-blooded (that 
is, non-emotional) evaluation of problems is the superior way for individuals to make 
decisions.   
In this essay, I argue that standard Economics can in fact yield important 
insights on the relationship between emotion and behavior, and do so cheaply.  The 
standard – or “neoclassical” – approach that individuals seek to maximize their utility 
is quite amenable to incorporating emotions.  As we will see, a merger of constrained 
optimization with emotions implies a simple, yet provocative result: if they affect 
behavior, then emotions must be a component of the utility function.   
This last point is, I believe, a subtle one that is overlooked in other discussions 
by economists considering how emotions influence behavior.  While the economics 
literature rarely takes on emotions on a formal basis, when it does, one approach is to 
assume a) that agents are maximize utility, and b) that the emotions are in the utility 
function just like any other utility generating component (Elster, 1998, p. 64).  I argue 
that the second assumption is unnecessary.  Assuming agents are utility maximizers – 
and that the emotions are in fact important – implies that the emotions are a part of 
the utility function.  On the other hand, if emotions are not in the utility function – 
and emotions are still important to behavior – then the agent cannot be optimizing.  
One goal of this essay is to establish this claim, and sketch out some of the features of 
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neoclassical theory that incorporates emotions. 
The second objective of this paper is to see how far the neoclassical approach 
can be pushed.  To this end, I consider a number of real-world behaviors through the 
lens of a neoclassical model and attempt to gauge where the model succeeds or fails.  
Perhaps the most revealing approach here is the application of Young’s theorem.  I 
show that some of the non-obvious mathematical implications of the model seem to 
jibe with our common experiences in the world.  In addition, I propose an 
interpretation of “cognitive dissonance” – a phenomenon commonly viewed as a 
failure by agents to form rational beliefs or expectations – in which the supposed 
“non-rational” beliefs are simply tools used for emotional gain, but do not reflect an 
agent’s underlying beliefs. 
2 Theoretical Principles 
The theoretical implications of incorporating emotions into the standard decision-
maker’s problem are straightforward.  In this section I highlight some of the basic 
price theory that underlies the arguments. 
2.1 Emotions in the Utility Function 
Here, I show that a neoclassical model that includes emotions does not need to make 
any assumptions that emotions are a component of the utility function.  Rather, 
emotions must be in the utility function as a consequence of two key assumptions: 
utility maximization, and behavior modification.  I state and informally prove this fact 
here: 
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Proposition 1: Ceteris peribus, if a utility maximizing 
agent with concave utility function U(C,.) in C alters 
her behavior as her emotional state changes (M), then 
emotion is an argument of her utility function.  That is, 
utility is given by U(C,M,.). 
 
Proof: See figure 3.1. Utility is plotted as a function of 
C on these graphs.  Suppose that the agent’s emotional 
state changes from M to M’, and the optimal level of C 
has changed.  In all possible cases where this is so, the 
slope of the utility function has changed at the initial 
level of C.  That is, UC is changed as M changes.  
Equivalently, UCM≠0.  This cannot be true if UM=0 at 
all levels of C.  Thus, in general UM≠0 and therefore 
emotion must be an argument of the utility function. 
 
The ceteris peribus assumption is included to control for changes in income.  
A lottery winner might feel happier and also increase his consumption, but this does 
not necessarily imply that happiness changes the marginal utility of his consumption.  
An alternative way to eliminate income effects is to assume preferences are quasi-
linear in C. 
Figure 3.1 shows three possible scenarios in which a change in emotion 
corresponds to a change in behavior.  In panel (A), utility is higher for all levels of C.  
In panel (B), utility is lower for all levels of C.  And finally in panel (C), utility is 
higher for some levels of consumption and lower for others.  Thus, we can see that 
regardless of what is the actual effect of the emotion on behavior, it is consistent with 
an emotion that is unambiguously “good” (i.e. one always raises utility), “bad,” or 
“sometimes good and sometimes bad.”  That this can be utilized in the context of 
widely varied emotions is appealing. 
There is a Corollary to Proposition 1:  if a change in emotion leads to changes 
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in behavior, but emotion is NOT in the utility function, then the agent cannot be 
acting in a utility maximizing way: 
 
Corollary 1: Ceteris Peribus, if an agent has a concave 
utility function U(C,.) and the emotion is not in her 
utility function, then if a change in emotion from M to 
M’ induces a choice of C that was strictly dominated 
when the emotion was at level M, then the agent is not 
acting in a utility maximizing way. 
 
Proof: If emotion is not in the utility function, then 
U(C,.) is unchanged as we move from M to M’.  
Changing the level of C to a previously strictly 
dominated choice when the utility function is 
unchanged implies that the agent cannot be maximizing 
utility. 
 
Corollary 1 is relevant when considering some attempts in the behavioral 
literature to incorporate “emotional” features into an agent’s constraint set, rather than 
into the objective.  Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) and Ozdenoren, Salant, and Silverman 
(2006), are two examples.  They suggest that self-control and willpower, respectively, 
are best modeled as constraints.  Note that the models in these cases are dynamic, 
while I am focusing on static ones.  However, there is an implicit assumption in these 
papers that the proposed emotional constraints are necessary to prevent deviations 
from optimal consumption paths.  That is, when these emotions are not in themselves 
valuable to utility, they influence behavior only when the behavior would otherwise 
be non-optimal in some sense, as is suggested by Corollary 1. 
Panel (D) of Figure 3.1 also suggests that the sign of the cross partial 
derivative UCM is linked to the interplay of emotions and behavior in a consistent way.  
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The result stated in the next Proposition turns out to be very important when we look 
for real-world instances of emotion operating from within the utility function. 
 
Proposition 2: Ceteris peribus, if dC/dM>0, then UCM>0.  
Alternatively, if dC/dM<0, then UCM<0. 
Proof: See figure 1.  Suppose M’>M (that is, the 
emotional state M’ is more “intense” than M), and 
dC/dM>0.  Figure 1 displays all three cases in which 
this is possible.  In each instance, the slope of the utility 
function is higher at the original level of consumption.  
That is, UC increases as M increases.  Equivalently, 
UCM>0.  The reverse is true if dC/dM<0. 
 
Note that in these pictures there is no motivation for the shift from M to M’.  
This is for the sake of generality: the results hold regardless of whether the change in 
emotional state is exogenous or endogenous.  That is, it does not matter if a change in 
emotional state is imposed from the outside (say, feeling sad if a family member dies) 
or is internally motivated (say, if one seeks psychotherapy to reduce depression).   
With emotions included as an argument of the utility function, it is desirable 
that our model allow for emotions to be, at least in part, endogenously determined.  
However, if emotions are indeed endogenous our model will require more structure 
with respect to how the emotions are created.  This leads to the next feature of the 
model. 
 
2.2 The Production Function for an Emotion 
Emotions are not tangible goods.  There is no relationship between physical capital 
and labor that is going to churn out emotions.  Nor can one purchase an emotion in 
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the marketplace.  At best, the market can only provide intermediate goods, such as 
psychoactive drugs or scary movies. 
At the same time, emotions do not appear out of thin air.  They are created in 
the mind – induced through the interplay of the environment, one’s own actions, and 
the neurons in the brain.  It seems reasonable to begin to think of these latter items as 
the “factors of production” for an emotion, and embed them within what I’ll call the 
“production function for an emotion,” or “EPF.” 
Definition: Let M(X,S) be an agent’s production 
function for an emotion M, where X is a vector 
representing the individual’s actions, and S is a vector 
representing the state (variables that are outside the 
agent’s control). 
 
The vectors X and S are essentially the endogenous and exogenous factors, 
respectively, that contribute to one’s emotional condition.  Using the examples above, 
the action of going to visit a psychologist to reduce depression would be an action in 
X, whereas the death of a family member would be a change in S.  In addition to 
exogenously induced emotions, the state could also include emotions carried forward 
from earlier periods.  If one enters our time period of interest in a bad mood, for 
instance, this may impact how emotions are generated in the current period. 
The production function M(X,S) may be very complicated.  In addition to 
complexity, agents may not completely understand how their own emotions are 
produced.  This would be particularly true for new experiences.  Having never taken 
action X0 while in state S0, how are agents to know their emotional response to it?  To 
the extent that agents incorrectly gauge how their emotions are formed, they may fail 
to optimize their utility.   
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This is a legitimate concern, but a concern that applies just as much to “non-
emotional” economics.  Even absent any emotional considerations, people often do 
not have all the information they need to make the utility maximizing decision.  
Furthermore, even when they do have the information, they are imperfect processors 
of that information.  We are not all chess grandmasters, after all.  A mis-specification 
or mis-evaluation of the EPF – and therefore failing to act optimally – is the same 
type of problem. 
 I abstract from this concern for the remainder of this piece, and will take as 
given that agents know their own production functions for emotions.  While people 
may not in fact precisely know how their emotions are produced, they frequently will 
have a very good idea of what makes them feel happy, afraid, guilty etc.  To the 
extent that they do make “errors,” it may well be that they were anticipating a given 
decision would lead to a different emotion than was actually produced.  These types 
of “emotional mistakes,” especially if the agent makes the error consistently, could be 
an interesting avenue of research, but I will not discuss it further here. 
While “production function for an emotion” is a new term, the idea that 
emotions can be defined in a mathematical form has sporadically appeared in the 
literature.  Becker initially developed the notion that production functions can be 
applied to a wider variety of problems than the fabrication of goods.  As for explicit 
production functions for emotions, Ackerlof and Dickens (1982) include a production 
function for fear in their paper on cognitive dissonance.  Glaeser (2002), in a working 
paper version of his paper on the politics of hatred, proposes a production function for 
hatred.  More recently, Kimball and Willis (2006) suggest a “household production 
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function for happiness,” which serves as the backbone of their work on utility and 
happiness. 
Laibson (2001) suggests a model of addiction that has a feature similar in 
many ways to an EPF.  He suggests that certain environmental cues can change the 
marginal utility of consumption for some goods; for instance, the smell of baking 
bread might make eating bread a more desirable activity.  I view these cues as 
arguments in one’s EPF.  The smell of the bread may induce a craving for bread – but 
the degree of that craving is also determined by exogenous factors (such as, whether 
or not one has just finished eating, or if one knows the baker to be a bad man), or 
endogenous (such as, the individual may be on a diet, which makes the craving even 
worse, or his mind is simply occupied with other concerns and he ignores the smell.)  
The proposed model here is essentially a more general version of Laibson’s. 
2.3 Price Theory with Emotions in the Utility Function 
Given the motivation of Proposition 1 and the notion of production functions for 
emotions, it is natural to now write utility in the general form U(C(X),M(X;S);S).  
The C, X, M and S may of course represent vectors of their respective variables.  I 
treat C(X) very flexibly throughout the remainder of the essay, but it can perhaps best 
be thought of as generic type of consumption resulting from actions X.  In a special 
case, X could represent consumption itself (if C(X)=X). The emotional state M is 
produced by an EPF as described above.  The vector of state variables S influences 
utility both through the emotional channel and a more direct one.  An example of the 
latter could be if your stomach is full, the utility from consuming a gourmet meal is 
lowered, regardless of the emotional impact that might result from such a meal.  
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Furthermore, the emotional punch of the gourmet meal might also be lowered if one 
has already eaten. 
Notice that in principle one could rewrite this utility function as U(X;S).  This 
moves us towards the normally presented form for utility that completely ignores any 
mention of emotion.  Indeed, this is one appealing feature of this manner of 
incorporating emotions into the utility function: it is entirely consistent with standard 
economic arguments.  All that has been done is added a layer of additional structure 
to the utility function.   
In many applications, the added complexity may not be important.  However, 
in studies of micro-level behavior, this extra dimension may be crucial.  In fact, I 
believe a model that explicitly considers emotions should be the default choice for 
behavioral economics.  At the very least, distinguishing the utility that is generated 
from specific emotions – and the intensity of those emotions – from the utility 
generated through other means may yield a much richer description of behavior. 
To help develop our intuition, let’s focus on the simplest case.  We’ll assume 
all the relevant functions are continuous, and our agent has only one decision to make: 
the magnitude of a single action x.  The maximization problem for the agent in this 
model is to choose a feasible x that maximizes his utility. 
 
( ( ), ( ; ); )
. .
x
Max U C x M x S S
s t x∈X
 (2.1) 





+ =  (2.2) 
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This implies the standard condition that the marginal rate of transformation 




UdCdxMRT MRSdM dM U
dx
−
= = = =  (2.3) 
An implication of (2.3) is that if C and M are both either increasing or 
decreasing in x – or equivalently, the MRT is positive – then UC and UM must have 
opposite signs at the optimum value of x.  If the MRT is negative, then UC and UM 
must have the same sign.   
This is reminiscent of a familiar idea in labor economics.  If the wage rate is 
positive, then the marginal rate of transformation dC/dN will be positive (where N is 
number of hours worked).  With the marginal utility of consumption assumed to be 
positive, it then must be the case that the marginal utility of labor is negative for the 
last hour of work. Even if the individual enjoys his work generally, if he is paid then 
it must be the case that the last hour of his labor has a negative marginal utility.  The 
same kind of result holds here, with emotions replacing labor in the equation. 
Of course, the MRT between emotions and consumption need not be positive.  
Indeed, the signs of all components of (2.3) will depend on the type of problem we 
are investigating.  This is one area where this framework becomes useful.  If we are 
examining a certain problem and have prior beliefs about the sign of some of the 
derivatives, then the first order conditions allow us to pin down the sign of the 
unknown terms.  That is, equation (2.3) can help us identify unknown features of the 
EPF or the marginal utility of an emotion.   
    125
2.4 Application: Guilt 
To illustrate the usefulness of this approach, let’s turn our attention to a particular 
emotion: guilt.  In this section, I explore several ways that the emotion of guilt may 
factor into rational decision making.  Let’s start with a simple example.  One finding 
from social psychology is that people often do not steal from others, even if there is 
no risk of getting caught.  Why not?  So long as the marginal utility from the stolen 
good is positive, if there are no repercussions from stealing, we ought to steal 
whenever the opportunity arises.  Of course, the marginal utility of consumption is 
not the only consideration when it comes to stealing.  Another is how stealing makes 
us feel.  And for most people, that feeling is guilt.  How can guilt inhibit theft, in the 
context of the economic model? 
Consider a petty theft, such as stealing office supplies from your employer.  
Let x represent the amount you steal.  If you steal a positive amount, but restrain 
yourself from stealing everything you can, then the first order conditions described 
above will apply to you.  Suppose the marginal utility of consumption is positive, the 
marginal utility of guilt is negative, and that our consumption rises the more we steal 
(either through consuming the pilfered office supplies or selling them).  Then, our 
rational framework implies that the last office supply you steal makes you feel guilty.  
That is, the EPF for guilt has a positive first derivative. 
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Our everyday experience makes this result seem almost trivial:  of course 
stealing can make us feel guilty, and of course we don’t like guilt.  Absent guilt, or 
some other factor making theft undesirable, every office will have been ripped-off to 
the studs in the wall.  That the economic model with guilt predicts this so cleanly is 
an appealing feature of the approach. 
Let’s now turn about a somewhat more interesting example: penance.  Many 
people who feel guilty about something take actions to try and alleviate that guilt.  
Examples of penitent behavior range from the sacred (Catholic traditions of 
confessing sins and repeated prayer) to the banal (washing of hands).  This latter 
example, dubbed the “Macbeth Effect,” has recently been uncovered by an 
experimental team from the University of Toronto (Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006).  
They find that individuals who were induced to recall previous acts of immoral 
behavior are more likely to wash their hands than those who were not so compelled.  
The feeling of guilt seems to trigger an urge to cleanse oneself physically. 
In this case, we let x represent the amount of penance performed.  Let’s also 
continue to assume UC>0, UM<0, and suppose that it is true that penance does indeed 
reduce the intensity of guilty feelings (that is, our EPF for guilt is decreasing in 
penance (dM/dx<0)).  This implies that, on the margin, it must be the case that 
consumption is lowered by penance.  This too jibes with our everyday intuition.  
Whether the time is spent on one’s knees in church or bathing 5 times a day, the act 
of penance necessarily implies the sacrifice of one’s consumption.  If it did not 
require such a sacrifice, then whenever we feel the slightest amount of guilt we would 
seek to alleviate it through penance at every possible.  This type of behavior is not 
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often observed. 




An implication of this result is that, all else equal, those whose consumption is 
highly impacted by penitent acts (perhaps through foregone income) will be less 
penitent than those for whom the opportunity cost of their time is low.  One way this 
might manifest itself is, all things equal, if those with a lot of unoccupied time (say, 
the elderly or unemployed) are more likely to engage in guilt-lessening behavior than 
other groups.  There may be data that support this conjecture. 
For a final case, consider charitable giving.  I focus on charity, because 
thinking about altruism more generally can awaken a nest of philosophical problems.  
This is largely due to a philosophical dimension of the problem.  Some would argue 
that any act that is truly altruistic must decrease the giver’s utility, relative to other 
feasible actions.  Otherwise, the act wouldn’t be altruistic, but self-serving.  
Describing altruism this way means that by definition an altruistic agent cannot be 
utility maximizing. 
Giving money to a charity unambiguously lowers one’s consumption.1  In the 
context of our simple model, this implies that it can only be optimal to donate if there 
is a compensating emotional return.  What sorts of emotional benefits are to be had 
                                                 
1 This assumes that the person does not receive sufficient economic benefits from giving.  For instance, 
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from charitable giving?  One explanation for charitable giving is that induces a 
“warm glow” feeling.  (See, for example, Andreoni 1990.) From the name “warm 
glow,” we could guess that it is a desirable emotion.  If charitable giving does indeed 
induce this emotion, then the first order conditions in fact demand this be true: it must 
be the case that UM >0. 




Another possible channel may exist if our agent believes he has an obligation 
to be charitable. In this case, a positive amount of giving may be optimal, even if he 
receives no other rewards.  This obligation may be a result of social pressures (say, 
there is a general consensus that the well-off should help support the needy, or if a 
political/religious organization to which one belongs encourages its members to 
contribute to certain causes), or a deep-seated sense of personal morality (say, to 
support a relative in financial distress).  Regardless of the source of this sense of 
obligation, failure to live up to one’s obligations may induce feelings of guilt.  
Charitable giving, to the extent that it satisfies the perceived obligation, lowers that 
guilt.  In this case, our table of derivatives will look very similar to the case of 
penitent behavior. 
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3 Young’s Theorem 
Young’s Theorem is a well known result from calculus that states that the mixed 
cross partial derivatives of a given function are equal to each other, regardless of the 
order in which the derivatives are taken.  If we are interested in a function U(C,M), 
say, then by Young’s Theorem it must be the case that UCM=UMC.2  In words, the 
change in the marginal utility of consumption when an emotion changes is exactly 
equal to the change in the marginal utility of the emotion when consumption changes.  
This simple fact, when combined with Proposition 2, turns out to yield non-obvious – 
and in principle testable – implications for our framework of economic agents acting 
optimally over their emotions. 
The way to apply this insight in practice is to first look for correlations 
between our “consumption” variable and a particular emotion.  Via Proposition 2, that 
correlation will imply a sign for the mixed cross-partial derivatives of the utility 
function.  Then, we can examine both orderings of the cross-partial derivative – by 
first treating one component of utility function as exogenous and the other as 
endogenous, and then try the reverse direction – and see if they both make sense.  If 
the implications of the cross-partials are not supported by the evidence, this suggests 
that the agent cannot be acting in a utility maximizing way. 
                                                 
2 Young’s theorem is a very general result, and does not rely on any assumptions about continuity or 
differentiability. 
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What do I mean by “evidence” here?  One type of evidence is just common 
experience.  What this approach lacks, unfortunately, is rigor.  Not only is it possible 
our interpretation of the events is incorrect, but in real life it can be difficult to 
separate the endogenous from the exogenous.  What Young’s Theorem offers is a 
causal line of thinking.  If such and such event is exogenous, then behavior adjusts 
thusly.  Observations from everyday life are not so clean, as what is exogenous and 
what is endogenous can be difficult to determine. 
However, in the controlled environment of a laboratory one can determine 
what is exogenous and what is endogenous.  In principle all of the conjectures 
implied by Young’s Theorem can be addressed through experimentation.  If, say, an 
experiment shows that triggering emotion A induces action B, a clever experimenter 
can reverse the stimuli.  That is, she can “force” the subject to take action B, and see 
if the subject then induces emotion A.  Successfully executing such an experiment 
can directly test the implications of Young’s Theorem. 
Let’s look at some examples of this technique. 
3.1 Cheating and Self-Esteem 
In an experimental setting, Aronson and Mattee (1968) found that individuals who 
have had their self-esteem artificially lowered are more likely to cheat at a subsequent 
game of cards.  Other studies have found that individuals with low levels of serotonin 
– a hormone which is strongly correlated with self-esteem – are more likely to 
commit impulsive crimes (Masters and McGuire, 1994).  Robert Wright (1994) 
interprets this from the perspective of evolutionary psychology: those who have been 
shunned by society (or feel that they are of little value to society) begin to believe that 
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they need to break the rules to get access to resources. 
Translating this into our Emotions in the Utility Function setting is 
straightforward.  If C is cheating, and M is self esteem, then the experimental results 
imply that dC/dM<0.  Therefore, by Proposition 2, UCM=UMC<0. The first of these 
cross partials derivatives suggests that if an individual has high self-esteem, he gets 
less utility from cheating.  This seems reasonable, as a genuinely confident person 
would seem to get little benefit from competing dishonestly in a contest, because he 
believes he will win anyway.  On the other hand an opponent who feels inferior may 
believe he can only hope to win by breaking the rules, or at least be more willing to 
accept awards earned through questionable means. 
We may be able to observe this tendency in a recent well-publicized case.  In 
Game of Shadows (Fainaru-Wada and Williams, 2006), the writers tell the story of 
Barry Bonds – a tremendously successful baseball player.  During the 1998 season, 
Bonds was overcome by feelings of jealousy with respect to the popular sluggers 
Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa.  Bonds had an intense desire to be considered the 
best player by others, and anything short of that enraged him.  In order to catch up, he 
(allegedly) began to intensively use performance enhancing drugs.  While Bonds, 
who already had established Hall of Fame credentials, would hardly seem a candidate 
for low self-esteem, the evidence does suggest that he was experiencing feelings of 
inferiority, and this apparently made cheating a more appealing option.  This outcome 
seems consistent with the experimental findings cited above. 
However, does the reverse implication suggested by Young’s theorem also 
hold?  It should be the case that if one cheats, the marginal utility of low self-esteem 
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rises.  So, if a person is obliged to cheat (or is already cheating), does he also tend to 
behave in ways that lower his self-esteem?  This is a more difficult direction to 
unravel, as it is harder to identify if a person is acting in a way that may lower his self 
esteem than it is to identify cheating.   
Let’s continue with the case of Barry Bonds and see if there are hints of this 
tendency.  When information on his steroid usage came to light, he did not publicly 
respond with self-righteous indignation.  More commonly he prevailed on a woe-is-
me response.  In one televised interview, he famously broke down in tears “like a 
broken man” (Marriotti, 2006).  “They can take me down. I don't really care.  I never 
cared,” said Bonds in a tearful tirade. “Baseball, if they want to take me down, go 
right ahead, take it. Anyone who ever knows me knows ... I don't care. But there are 
so many other people who depend on me to stay strong.”  One interpretation of 
Bonds’s conduct is that through the act of portraying himself to the public as being 
helpless, and conceding defeat to his “enemies,” he was engaging in a self-humbling 
behavior.  In the context of Young’s theorem, this type of self-esteem-lowering 
behavior becomes more desirable when an agent is cheating.  
Of course, one does not want to generalize from the exceedingly complex – 
and difficult to interpret – case of a single person.  I use the Barry Bonds example 
here only because it is a particularly vivid demonstration of the application of 
Young’s theorem.  The point is, if this interaction between dishonest behavior and 
self esteem is a result of the agent’s making utility maximizing choices, Young’s 
theorem provides clear predictions for both directions of the interaction.  While one 
direction has been tested experimentally – that those with (exogenously) low self-
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esteem tend to be willing to behave dishonestly – the other has not.   
Consider an experiment in which a subject is either induced to cheat, or 
otherwise unfairly wins a contest.  Is the subject indeed more likely to lean towards 
behaviors that reduce his self esteem than those in a control group?  This tendency 
might be manifest itself in a variety of ways, such as making self-deprecating 
statements, or self-identification with individuals of dubious moral character.   
Another virtue of such an experiment is that, by gauging which “esteem-
lowering” activity (if any) the cheating agent engages in, it may more precisely 
identify what “self-esteem” is referring to in this context.  Is it that the person feels 
inferior relative to some internal personal standard?  If so, perhaps this could be 
revealed in an experiment where the cheating agent gets to choose whether or not to 
write a brief essay that offers him the opportunity to make humble declarations.  Or, 
perhaps self-esteem is more closely related to the image of being a social outsider.  In 
that case, does he make decisions that try to imply some connection between himself 
and those perceived as villains?  Consider, for example, offering the cheating subject 
the choice to watch clips from either the films The Godfather or Superman.  Are 
cheaters more apt to choose the mobster movie? 
3.2 Wanting to Hate 
Now consider a soldier fighting in a war.  The more he hates the men on the other 
side of the line, the less hesitation he will have when trying to kill them, and, 
presumably, the more effective a soldier he will be.  He may lose utility when he kills, 
and the emotion of hating the enemy may also lower his utility, but the cold hard fact 
is the more he hates the enemy, the better he is at killing them. 
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If this account is accurate, then translating the result into our framework is 
simple: dC/dM >0, where C in this case represents the number of enemy killed, and 
M is the emotion of hatred.  By Proposition 2, then, it must be true that UCM>0: the 
marginal utility of killing is greater if one feels more intense hatred.  Even if killing 
the enemy lowers utility overall (UC<0), by hating them more, the negative effect of 
killing on utility is reduced.  This seems like a natural result.  The more you hate 
someone, the less you mind if that person dies – even if you happen to be the 
instrument of death. 
By Young’s Theorem, however, UMC>0 as well.  So it is equally true that if a 
soldier is obligated to kill, then his marginal utility of hatred increases.  That is, he 
will have an incentive to increase his hatred for the enemy if he has to kill them.  The 
literature on internal conflict resolution suggests that this is a common practice.  As 
one writer puts it, “[p]sychologically, it is necessary to categorize one's enemy as sub-
human in order to legitimize increased violence or justify the violation of basic 
human rights” (Maiese, 2003). 
We would thus expect soldiers in the field to tend to want to raise their hatred 
of the enemy.  This could manifest itself in behaviors in which they actively seek out 
negative information about the enemy.  They may consume negative propaganda, or 
listen to other soldiers who are expressing their own hatred.  Even if a soldier resists 
the incentive to try to actively hate the enemy more, being in an environment where 
he might need he might need to kill the enemy might make him resist hateful attitudes 
less than he would ordinarily. 
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3.3 Sex and Desire 
An article in The New York Times (4/10/07) recently noted that there is a burgeoning 
interest in academic circles regarding research on human sexuality.  Much of this 
work is, in essence, an attempt to identify components of the EPF for sexual arousal 
and desire.  The research suggests that the EPFs for sexual desire can be very 
complicated, but there has been progress in pinpointing particular sensations or 
images that induce sexual desire. 
It is probably not controversial to suggest that sexual activity and feelings of 
desire are positively correlated.  This indicates that dC/dM>0, where C is the 
frequency of sexual activity, and M is desire.  By our usual arguments, this implies 
UCM=UMC>0.  The first of these cross-partial derivatives seems obvious.  Feeling 
stronger desire raises the marginal utility of sex, if for no other reason than that sex 
can directly address the desires.  Feeling desire in essence raises the incentive for 
having sex. 
The reverse implication is also a natural one, if perhaps less obvious.  If one is 
participating in sexual activity, then the marginal utility of desire is higher.  That is, if 
one is having sex, one wants to feel desire.  For instance, a person might be obliged to 
have sex in order to satisfies one’s partner, or for purely for procreative reasons.  In 
this case, it is not uncommon for the less interested partner to try and induce lustful 
feelings, perhaps through fantasy or role play.  Arousal-seeking behavior of this sort 
is a natural consequence of the neoclassical model. 
Much of the demand for pornography might be generated by a similar process.  
When alone, a person might desire sexual release in order to relax, or to aid falling 
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asleep.  If solitary sexual activity is initiated for such non-emotional reasons, the 
cross-partials still indicate that the individual still has an incentive to increase his 
level of desire as part of the process.  Use of pornography may serve to raise the level 
of desire.   
4 Cognitive Dissonance 
Cognitive dissonance is a term used by psychologists to describe situations in which 
an individual holds incompatible cognitions.  Typically, one of these cognitions is the 
agent’s own action or behavior, while another is a belief related to that action.  Leon 
Festinger (1957) is credited with originating cognitive dissonance theory.  The 
primary thesis of this theory is that individuals who hold incompatible cognitions 
experience discomfort, and they will seek to reduce that discomfort.  In the years 
following the development of this theory, a number of experiments have yielded 
results supporting this thesis. 
Cognitive Dissonance theory is potentially troublesome for economics.  
Perhaps the cleanest way to demonstrate this is through one of Aesop’s fables, called 
The Fox and the Grapes.  One afternoon a hungry fox notices a bunch of grapes 
dangling high up on a fence.  He wants to eat them, but try as he might, he just can’t 
jump high enough to reach them.  After a while, he gives up and sulks away, 
muttering to himself “the grapes are probably sour, anyway.”   The fox’s attitude 
towards the grapes suggests the moral “it is easy to despise what you cannot get,” and 
this tale has thus spawned the term “sour grapes.” 
The cognitive dissonance interpretation of the fable is this: the cognition that 
the hungry fox is not eating the grapes is inconsistent with the cognition that the 
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grapes are good.   To eliminate the dissonance, there is pressure to change one of his 
cognitions.  He is powerless to change the former, but he may be – and in the story 
apparently is – able to change the latter, his belief about the quality of the grapes.3   
In economics, applications of the neoclassical model usually insist that agents 
form beliefs based on an objective appraisal of the information available – that is, that 
the beliefs are “rational.”  In this story, the fox’s belief about the quality of the grapes 
has apparently changed – he wouldn’t have tried to get the grapes in the first place if 
he initially believed they were sour.  However, there is no new information about the 
quality of the grapes that has led to this new belief.  This seems to be a non-rational 
belief.   
Economists have tackled this problem in a variety of ways.  Brunnermeier and 
Parker (2005) endorse the possibility that agents choose a set of “optimal beliefs.”  
These optimal beliefs may differ from rational beliefs, but in some cases the hedonic 
benefits of holding optimistic – though non-rational – beliefs about the future 
outweigh the costs of holding those beliefs (through any non-optimal choices based 
on those beliefs).  I should note that these beliefs are not an argument in the utility 
function.  Instead, the agent’s consumption plan is changed in such a way as to confer 
immediate benefits to utility.  Bénebau and Tirole (2002) make a similar conjecture 
with respect to self-confidence.  While they do not emphasize the hedonic virtues of 
holding a false belief about one’s own abilities, they suggest that having high self-
confidence can enhance an agent’s ability to perform a given task.  
Approaches to the problem of cognitive dissonance by Ackerlof and Dickens 
                                                 
3 Refinements of the dissonance theory suggest that the tendency to reduce dissonance is stronger when 
both cognitions are, to some extent, entered into voluntarily, which is not the case for the fox. 
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(1982) and Rabin (1992) are more commensurate with the approach endorsed here.  
Both of these papers take the position that dissonance imposes a direct psychic cost in 
the individual’s objective.  In Ackerlof and Dicken’s case, they argue that fear 
effectively lowers the net payment to an individual performing a dangerous job.  
Rabin proposes that dissonance lowers the value of doing an “immoral” action, such 
as eating veal.  He argues that the amount of veal consumed and the belief about the 
morality of eating the veal are determined at the same time, so as to maximize utility. 
A feature that is common to all these approaches is that they all feature non-
rational beliefs.  This is not necessarily that bad.  For the consistency of the 
neoclassical approach, which is more important: for beliefs to be rational or for 
behavior to maximize utility?  I would argue that the latter is more important.  
Conditional on the fox’s inability to get the grapes, he can either believe the grapes 
are good – and experience the negative emotional consequences of dissonance – or 
believe the grapes are not good, and not experience dissonance.  The latter would 
seem to be the option that maximizes utility, and it would certainly appear that this 
option indicates the formation of non-rational beliefs. 
However, I suggest that even in light of cognitive dissonance we ought to not 
be quite so quick to abandon the notion of rational beliefs as our benchmark case.  To 
this end, take a moment to think about how the fox would react if – after giving up on 
the grapes and concluding that they are sour – the grapes were to fall off the fence.  
Would he turn up his nose at them, since he now supposedly believes they are sour, or 
would he change his belief and eat them?  Since his beliefs seem to be so malleable to 
begin with, I suspect he would now decide that perhaps the grapes might not be so 
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bad after all.  What does this thought experiment say about the whole notion of a 
belief more generally?  Consider the following conjecture. 
Suppose are two different classes of beliefs.  One set does reflect an objective 
interpretation of evidence.  Call these one’s “true beliefs.”  Because these beliefs are 
dictated by rational deliberation, there is no room for choice about these beliefs.  A 
second class of beliefs we can call “pseudo-beliefs.”  These are beliefs that can be 
modified to suit emotional needs.  The pseudo-beliefs can override the true beliefs if 
the combination of possible cognitions (action and pseudo-belief) yield more utility 
than the other pair of possible cognitions (action and true belief).  True beliefs, while 
they may be concealed by a pseudo-belief, manifest themselves whenever the agent 
must make a choice involving that belief.  Such an interpretation of beliefs allows the 
fox to turn up his nose at the grapes when they are unreachable on the fence, but 
immediately return to feast when they blow off.  His true belief is that the grapes are 
(probably) not sour, but when he couldn’t eat them, he consoled himself by adopting 
a pseudo-belief that they (probably) were sour. 
When viewing beliefs in such a framework, the formation of behaviors and 
beliefs are essentially broken into two parts.  The first part is an action taken based on 
true beliefs, the second part is choosing a pseudo-belief that impacts emotions in such 
a way as to raise utility.  For instance, a person might really like veal and decide to 
eat lots of it, despite any qualms about the morality of eating it.  Conditional on his 
eating the veal, he will suffer emotionally if he thinks of himself as being immoral.  It 
is therefore optimal to induce compensating emotions by justifying to himself (or 
others) that he is not immoral.  That is, he adopts a pseudo-belief that eating veal is 
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not so harmful after all.  In the laboratory, when his beliefs seem to change in 
response to his behavior, it is called reducing cognitive dissonance.  In the framework 
of Emotions the Utility Function, the dissonance reduction boils down to making a 
utility maximizing choice of a belief – with emotions serving as the conduit between 
the two.  The strict neoclassical model continues to be relevant, because at a deep 
level he is aware of his true beliefs about eating veal. 
Studies of galvanic skin response (GSR) – a measurement of the electrical 
conductivity of skin – show hints that such a multi-layered belief system is not purely 
conjecture.  It has been found that when an individual hears a recording of her own 
voice, GSR levels rise more than when she hears the voice of others.  Interestingly, 
researchers have observed that if a subject fails at some contrived task (lowering self-
esteem), she is more likely to deny that a recording of her voice is her own.  However, 
while a subject may deny the voice is hers, her GSR reading indicates that in fact she 
does, at least on some level, recognize the voice as her own.  Amazingly, the 
experiment then shows that when self-esteem levels of a subject are artificially raised, 
the subject is more likely to identify other people’s voices as her own – even though 
her GSR level continues to give an accurate identification.  (Cited in Trivers, 1985.)   
This result suggests that at a deep level, agents can indeed hold a “true belief” 
about the world even when espousing a “psuedo-belief,”  with the divergence 
between the two being triggered by emotional factors.  The neoclassical approach to 
studying emotions outlined here suggests that when we observe as reduction in 
cognitive dissonance, we may interpret this as a utility maximizing manipulation of 
beliefs.  
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To illustrate this, consider a common example of what one might call 
cognitive dissonance: the belief in heaven.  Over 89% of Americans claim to believe 
in heaven, and 80% of those believe they are themselves going to heaven (ABC News 
Poll, 10/2005).  It should then be surprising that people feel sad when a good person 
dies, or if they themselves are diagnosed with a fatal disease.  If good people all go to 
the eternal paradise of heaven, then death would seem to be a wonderful thing.  Yet 
this is not how death is thought of in most circles. 
The above interpretation of cognitive dissonance could explain this apparent 
contradiction.  There is one fundamental cognition that everyone possesses: I exist.  
What does death represent?  The end of my existence.  The belief in heaven may seek 
to eliminate the dissonance that these mutually exclusive ideas generate, by replacing 
the cognition that existence ends with the more emotionally satisfying cognition that 
existence continues in paradise.   
As there is no verifiable evidence that heaven exists, the belief in heaven is 
unlikely to be a true belief as I have defined it.  That heaven is actually a pseudo-
belief is revealed when an emotion arousing event – such as a friend’s death, or a 
terminal diagnosis – triggers those emotions that depend in part on the true belief.  
This interpretation suggests that people adopt the psuedo-belief in heaven because the 
dissonance resulting from holding the true belief may be too painful.  That is, the 
model of this paper suggests that adopting a pseudo-belief may be viewed as the 
result of a utility maximizing strategy – where we take seriously the role of Emotions 
in the Utility Function.. 
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5 Conclusion 
This essay has been an attempt to justify the usage of strictly neoclassical economic 
models that include emotions as benchmarks for micro-level behaviors.  The first 
objective was to show that such models – in which agents seek the optimal choice and 
emotions matter for behavior – necessarily imply that the emotions must be 
represented as an argument of the utility function.  That is, for a neoclassical model, 
one need not assume that agents optimize and emotions are in the utility function 
when studying emotionally-linked actions.  Only the former is required.  This is a 
subtle point that has not been addressed in the literature.  Being able to reduce the 
number of assumptions when evaluating such problems is a non-trivial realization. 
Given that the conventional tools of the economics trade are most useful in the 
context of agents who are maximizing some objective, it would seem that it is in the 
interests of economists to push the neoclassical model with Emotions in the Utility 
Function to its limits.  In addition to straightforward undergraduate-level price-theory, 
I have suggested that extensions of the model yield hypotheses for behavior in a 
variety of contexts that seem consistent with common experience.  The application of 
Young’s Theorem is particularly useful in this respect, as it can often suggest non-
obvious implications that both seem reasonable and are in principle testable in the lab 
– a very useful feature.  The model also provides the structure for a purely 
neoclassical interpretation of the phenomenon known as cognitive dissonance. 
What this essay does not do is try to explain all emotionally-linked behavior 
in terms of constrained optimization.  Such an attempt would likely fail, as emotions, 
particularly intense emotions, may well corrupt one’s ability to make an optimal 
    143
choice.  However, I suggest that abandoning the standard economic framework 
should be the researcher’s second option.  Rather, one should try hard to evaluate 
behaviors in light of optimal choice.  What this essay has attempted to convey is that 
carefully scrutinizing the role of Emotions in the Utility Function is an important first 











Case 1: Higher M leads to higher U at every C
(Emotion is unambiguously desirable.)
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Case 2: Higher M leads to lower U at every C
(Emotion is unambiguously undesirable)
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Case 3: Higher M leads to higher U at some 
values of C, lower U at other values of X.
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If a higher M induces a higher C, then the cross-
partial derivative must be positive in the region 
between CM and CM’.
In all 3 cases, the increased emotion has changed the slope of 
the utility function.  Thus, it must be IN the utility function.
(In other words, since UCM≠0, UM≠0.)
0
Furthermore, note that the slope 
of the utility function increased 
in all three cases.
Generally, if dC/dM>0, then UCM>0, and vice versa.144
Figure 3.1  Hypothetical Responses of Consumption to a Change in Emotion
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